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Canst thou not minister to a mind diseas'd, / Pluck from the
memory a rooted sorrow, / Raze out the written troubles of the
brain, / And with some sweet oblivious antidote / Cleanse the
stuff'd bosom of that perilous stuff / Which weighs upon the
heart?
- Macbeth'
Retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation all
presuppose a particularview of a person's existence over time.
2
- Rebecca Dresser
INTRODUCTION

Developments in cognitive neuroscience-the science of how
the brain enables the mind--continue to prompt profound scholarly
debate and reflection on the practice and theory of criminal law.
Advances in the field have raised vexing questions relating to lie
detection, interrogation methods, the Fifth Amendment right against
compelled self-incrimination, competency to stand trial, defenses to
guilt (such as diminished capacity and insanity), sentencing, and the
relationship between moral responsibility and punishment.3 Similarly,
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 3.
2. Rebecca Dresser, PersonalIdentity and Punishment, 70 B.U. L. REV. 395, 397 (1990).
3. See, e.g., Dov Fox, The Right to Silence as ProtectingMental Control, 42 AKRON L. REV.
763, 765, 801 (2009) (arguing for Fifth Amendment protection against techniques such as brain
imaging that seek to ascertain a person's thoughts); Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim
Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 406-10
(2006) (providing a neuroscience perspective on Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), which
held imposition of the death penalty on defendants under eighteen years old unconstitutional);
Michael S. Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 301, 321-37 (2006) (arguing that neuroscience evidence should be subject to the same
1.
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for the past decade, philosophers, scientists, clinicians, and legal
scholars have been engaged in a major debate about the cognitive
neuroscience of memory and new capacities to modify it by
neurobiological means. The primary focus of such debate has been on
the ethical dimensions of memory modification. 4 To date, however,

Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections as other types of evidence); Michael L. Perlin, "And I
See Through Your Brain": Access to Experts, Competency to Consent, and the Impact of
Antipsychotic Medications in Neuroimaging Cases in the Criminal Trial, 2009 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 4, http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/perlin-and-i-see.pdf (discussing the impact of neuroimaging
evidence in criminal procedure); 0. Carter Snead, Cognitive Neuroscience and the Future of
Punishment, in TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (Jeffrey Rosen
http://www.brookings.edu/-/medialFiles/rc/papers/2010/
available at
ed.,
forthcoming),
(relating developments in cognitive
1228_neuroscience_snead/1228_neuroscience-snead.pdf
neuroscience to conceptions of punishment in the criminal law); 0. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging
and the "Complexity" of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1318-27 (2007) (exploring
the relationship between emerging neuroimaging technology, capital mitigation, and theories of
punishment); Sean Kevin Thompson, The Legality of the Use of Psychiatric Neuroimaging in
Intelligence Interrogation, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1601, 1611-36 (2005) (examining the legality of
using neuroimaging during interrogations of foreign detainees); see also Bruce A. Arrigo,
Punishment, Freedom, and the Culture of Control: The Case of Brain Imaging and the Law, 33
AM. J.L. & MED. 457, 464-72 (2007) (examining neuroimaging as a mechanism of a "culture of
contror' as understood through critical social theory); Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through
a Scanner Darkly: FunctionalNeuroimagingas Evidence of a Criminal Defendant's Past Mental
States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119, 1128-30 (2010) (commenting on the use of brain mapping
technology to establish requisite state of mind in criminal cases); Owen Jones et al., Brain
Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5,
http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/jones-brain-imaging.pdf (providing an overview of brain imaging and
its use in legal proceedings); J.W. Looney, Neuroscience's New Techniques for EvaluatingFuture
Dangerousness:Are We Returning to Lombroso's Biological Criminality?,32 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L. REV. 301 (2010) (looking at predictive neuroscience as it relates to the criminal law); Julie
Elizabeth Myers, Comment, The Moment of Truth for fMRI. Will Deception Detection Pass
Admissibility Hurdles in Oklahoma?, 6 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 47 (2010), http://www.okjolt
.org/images/pdf/2010okjoltrev47.pdf (commenting on whether or not neuroimaging as a reliable
form of lie detection will pass admissibility tests in Oklahoma).
4.
See, e.g., BRITISH MED. AsS'N, BOOSTING YOUR BRAINPOWER: ETHICAL ASPECTS OF
COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENTS 16-28 (2007) (discussing ethical implications of cognitive
enhancements); PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, BEYOND THERAPY: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND
THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 44-56 (2003) (discussing the ethical implications of genetic
engineering); Martha J. Farah et al., Neurocognitive Enhancement: What Can We Do and What
Should We Do?, 5 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 421, 421-24 (2004) (discussing possible
neurocognitive enhancements and the resulting ethical and policy implications); Adam J. Kolber,
Therapeutic Forgetting:The Legal and Ethical Implications of Memory Dampening, 59 VAND. L.
REV. 1561, 1595-613 (2006) (analyzing the ethical issues surrounding memory-dampening
technology); see also Henry T. Greely et al., Towards Responsible Use of Cognitive-Enhancing
Drugs by the Healthy, 456 NATURE 702, 703-05 (2008) (suggesting some general ethical
guidelines for the development of cognitive-enhancing drugs); Michael Henry, Jennifer R.
Fishman & Stuart J. Youngner, Propranolol and the Prevention of Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder:Is It Wrong to Erase the "Sting"of Bad Memories?, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Sept. 2007, at 12,
12 (discussing specific memory erasure to prevent PTSD, and followed by academic responses
and critiques of the authors' position); Erik Parens, The Ethics of Memory Blunting and the
Narcissism of Small Differences, 3 NEUROETHICS 99, 104-06 (2010) (discussing disagreement
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there has been no in-depth scholarly synthesis of these two important
and related avenues of inquiry. This Article means to open the
discussion about the implications of neurobiological memory
modification for criminal law. Its point of entry is the fertile context of
criminal punishment, in which memory plays a crucial role.
Specifically, this Article will argue that there is a deep relationship
between memory and the foundational principles justifying how
punishment should be distributed, including retributive justice,
deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation, moral education, and
restorative justice. For all such theoretical justifications, the questions
of whom and how much to punish are inextricably intertwined with
how a crime is remembered-by the offender, by the sentencing
authority, and by the broader community. Because this is so, new
neurobiological techniques to modify memory-including interventions
to erase some or all memory, to dampen the emotional or affective
content of memory, and to enhance the duration and intensity of
memory-pose, in principle, special challenges for the just and
effective distribution of punishment. This Article explores the
substance and contours of these challenges. It is meant to prepare the
necessary groundwork for future scholarship on how the law, as
enacted, enforced, and interpreted, should respond (if at all) to such
concerns.
To that end, Part I offers a necessarily compressed and basic
account of the cognitive systems and biological mechanisms of
memory. It discusses how revolutionary developments in molecular
and systems biology prepared the way for a cognitive neuroscience of
memory. It concludes with a discussion of the biological role of
emotion in memory. Part II explores a variety of techniques for
modifying memory, including memory erasure, memory "dampening"
(down-regulating the emotional content of memory), and memory
enhancement. Part III offers a humanistic account of memory and its
role for the individual and his relationship with others (both on a
small and large scale). This Part concludes with a brief reflection on
memory, emotion and morality. Part IV explores the implications of
memory modification for punishment. It includes a reflection on law
and memory as a general matter. It then takes each traditional
distributive principle of punishment (retributive justice, deterrence,
rehabilitation, incapacitation, moral education, and restorative
justice) and shows how the central animating aims of each depend in
regarding the different circumstances in which memory blunting might be ethically and socially
acceptable).
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crucial ways upon the true (meaning accurate) and fitting (in terms of
emotional modulation) memory of the defendant, the sentencing
authority, and the broader community. Part IV uses hypothetical
cases to illustrate the variety of ways in which memory modification
might confound the effective and just distribution of punishment
(especially capital punishment). The Article concludes by flagging
future questions for consideration.
Before proceeding, it is necessary to state clearly that this
Article is not claiming that the era of widespread and effective
neurobiological memory modification is upon us. To the contrary, the
science of this field is in its infancy. Moreover, the chief clinical
applications of the memory modification interventions discussed below
are for individuals suffering from diseases and disorders that touch
and concern memory (for example, Alzheimer's disease and PTSD).
The Article is certainly not meant as a criticism of this avenue of
research or those applications. That said, there is widespread interest
(and thus a potentially lucrative market) for memory enhancement in
healthy people (for example, improving memory beyond the normal
range). This Article does not engage the ethical question of
enhancement as such. Instead, it takes these projected uses as a
fruitful opportunity to consider the relationship between memory and
punishment and thus prepare the groundwork for a future discussion
of how, if at all, the law should respond. It is always useful to consider
such questions before novel biotechnological interventions move into
widespread use. In this way, this Article means to follow the wise (and
pithy) observation of Steven P.R. Rose that "it is important that we try
to be proactive in advance of the technological development, rather
5
than constantly trying to close already open stable doors."
I. WHAT IS MEMORY? A COGNITIVE AND SCIENTIFIC ACCOUNT

During the past two centuries, the study of memory, and the
study of cognition in general, has been central to three
disciplines:first philosophy, then psychology, and now biology.
6
- Larry R. Squire
To explore fully the challenges posed by new neurological
techniques of memory modification for criminal punishment, it is first
necessary to discuss the cognitive and biological dimensions of
5.

Stephen P.R. Rose, 'Smart Drugs: Do They Work? Are They Ethical? Will They Be

Legal?, 3 NATuRE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE, 975, 978 (2002).

6.

Larry R. Squire, Memory Systems of the Brain: A Brief History and Current Perspective,

82 NEUROBIOLOGY LEARNING & MEMORY, 171, 175 (2004).

1200

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:4:1195

memory. The science of memory is obviously a vast and contested
domain. It would require many volumes to engage this field
responsibly. This, however, is far beyond the scope of the present
inquiry. Rather, the following will be a necessarily cursory treatment,
with special emphasis on the forms of memory most relevant to the
question at hand.
Though memory has long been the focus of philosophical
reflection, 7 the first empirical study of memory and its function was
done by Hermann Ebbinghaus in 1885, who conducted an experiment
(using himself as the sole subject) meant to measure the temporal
relationship between encoding, retrieving, and forgetting information.
He memorized long sequences of nonsense syllables, and tested his
own memory, varying the length of time between learning the lists
and trying to recall them. He found that the longer the delay, the less
he could recall.8 He also learned that memories are strengthened by
repetition. 9 Later, in 1904, evolutionary biologist Richard Semon 10
published a monograph, Die Mneme (a reference to the Greek goddess
of memory, 'Mnemosyne"), in which he "tried to unite the biological
analysis of heredity with the psychological analysis of memory.""I
Semon conceived of memory as a biologically-based mechanism for
preserving experiences over time.12 One of Semon's lasting
contributions to the science of memory was his term "engram,"
denoting the "enduring change in the nervous system ('memory trace')

7.
See, e.g., PLATO, THEAETETUS 163a-64c (Bernard Williams ed., M.J. Levett trans.,
Hackett Publ'g Co. 1992) (n.d.); ARISTOTLE, ON MEMORY & REMINISCENCE passim (G.R.T. Ross
trans., Arno Press 1973) (n.d.); AUGUSTINE, II CONFESSIONS 93-145 (William Watts trans.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1999) (1631); RENE DESCARTES, PASSIONS OF THE SOUL 41-42, 59, 90-91,
132, 134 (Stephen Voss trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1989) (1649); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 14
(Oxford Univ. Press 1958) (1651); JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
141-43, in 33 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD (Mortimer J. Adler ed., Robert P. Gwinn,
2d ed. 1990) (1690); DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING passim, in
33 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD, supra (1748); FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE

GENEALOGY OF MORALS 57-96 (Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., Vintage Books 1969)
(1887); GEORGE SANTAYANA, 1 THE LIFE OF REASON 394-96 (Prometheus Books 1998) (1905);

BERTRAND RUSSELL, THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE passim (Elizabeth Ramsden Eames ed., George
Allen & Unwin 1984) (1913).
8.

DANIEL L. SCHACTER, SEARCHING FOR MEMORY: THE BRAIN, THE MIND, AND THE PAST 73

(1996).
9.

LARRY R. SQUIRE & ERIC R. KANDEL, MEMORY: FROM MIND TO MOLECULES 4 (1999).

10.

Semon was a student of Ernst Haeckl. DANIEL L. SCHACTER, FORGOTTEN IDEAS,

NEGLECTED PIONEERS: RICHARD SEMON AND THE STORY OF MEMORY 3 (2001).

11.
12.

SCHACTER, supra note 8, at 57.
See id. (describing the origins of Die Mneme).
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that conserves effects of experience over time." 13 As will be discussed
further below, 14 this notion of a "memory trace" closely tracks the
modern view that a new pattern of neural connections in15the brain,
strengthened over time, is the 'brain's record of the event.
Thereafter, psychology continued to be the principle
disciplinary locus of the study of memory. The founder of modern
psychology, William James, devoted much attention to the question of
memory. 16 Researchers Georg Mfller and Alfons Pilzecker suggested
that lasting memory becomes "consolidated" over time. 17 The
"Behaviorist Revolution" led to important innovations (such as the
work on classical conditioning by Pavlov and trial and error learning
by Thorndike) allowing for the study of learning and memory in
animals.' i The "Cognitive Revolution" further deepened the study of
memory, including especially the work of Frederic C. Bartlett, who
studied memory in a naturalistic way in human subjects. 19
Many important early developments in the science of memory
in human subjects emerged from research involving amnesiacs. The
famous case of Henry Molaison ("H.M."), studied by Scoville and
Milner in 1951,20 for example, shed light on the distinctive systems of
memory and their reliance on different regions of the brain. As a
treatment for seizures, H.M. had a number of structures in his medial
temporal lobes ('MTL") removed, including much of his hippocampus,
his amygdala, and some adjacent portions of the temporal cortex. This
erased his memories of personal experiences shortly before the
operation, though he could still retain some memories predating that
event. He was incapable, however, of forming new memories of
personal experiences, though he could learn new skills. 21 The case of
13. Id. Schacter notes Semon's other terminological contributions, including "engraphy"
(encoding information), and "ecphory" (retrieval of information). Famed U.S. psychologist Henry
J. Watt thought that Semon's most important contribution was the "concept of the ecphoric
stimulus." Id.
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. SCHACTER, supra note 8, at 59. Schacter notes that Donald Hebb, a Canadian
psychologist, was the first researcher to suggest this conception of memory. Id.
16.

See WILLIAM JAMES, 1 THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 643-89 (1890) (devoting an

entire chapter to a discussion of memory).
17. SQUIRE & KANDEL, supranote 9, at 4.
18. Id. at 5.
19. Id. at 6.
20. William Beecher Scoville & Brenda Milner, Loss of Recent Memory After Bilateral
Hippocampal Lesions, 20 J. NEUROLOGY, NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY 11 (1957).

21. Id. at 17; see also SCHACTER, supra note 8, at 137 (discussing H.M.'s memory loss); C.
Stark, DeclarativeMemory, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BEHAviORAL NEUROSCIENCE 371, 371 (2010)
(discussing H.M.).
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H.M. revealed that the MTL plays a time-limited role in encoding
certain kinds of memories, memory and cognition are separate and
distinct, short-term (working) memory does not rely on the same
structures in the MTL, and some types of long-term memory (motor
22
skills, etc.) do not rely on the MTL.
Finally, the "Biological Revolution" saw developments in
molecular biology (including especially the work of Watson and Crick
on the structure of DNA) and, later, systems biology (augmented by
developments in structural and functional imaging techniques) that
advanced, the science of memory further than ever before. 2 3 As a
result, there is now a large and growing understanding of how certain
genes (and related factors), the molecular mechanisms of neural
signaling, and the various circuits and regions of the brain all support
24
and sustain human memory.
In short, in the fairly recent past, an interdisciplinary
synthesis of clinicians (including psychologists, neurologists, and
psychiatrists),
cognitive
psychologists,
and
neuroscientists
25
revolutionized the science of memory. This has opened the possibility
of a cognitive neuroscience of memory integrated with a molecular
biology of cognition.26 As a result, memory can now be explored in
terms of cognition, cellular and molecular mechanisms, and the neural
systems of the brain.27 In this way, "[m]emory promises to be the first
mental faculty to be understandable in a language that makes a
bridge from molecules to mind, that is, from molecules to cells, to
28
brain systems, and to behavior."
A. The Cognitive "Systems" of Memory
Modern scientists, clinicians, and scholars have long suspected
that memory is a multifaceted faculty, composed of distinctive

22. See Stark, supra note 21, at 371; see also SQUIRE & KANDEL, supra note 9, at 15 (using
the case of H.M. to describe the difference between declarative and nondeclarative memory).
23. SQUIRE & KANDEL, supra note 9, at 7.
24. See id. at 135-40 (discussing the molecular biology of memory and the effect of genetics
on memory).
25. SCHACTER, supra note 8, at 4-6.
26. SQUIRE & KANDEL, supra note 9, at 211.
27. Id. at 7 ("[Ihe biology of memory can now be studied at two different levels, one aimed
at nerve cells and the molecules within nerve cells, and the other aimed at brain structures,
circuitry, and behavior.').
28. Id. at 3.

20111

MEMORYAND PUNISHMENT

1203

divisions. 29 Around 1980, as part of the culmination of memory
research involving human and animal subjects, scientists "converged
on the view that a fundamental distinction could be drawn between a
kind of memory that is accessible to conscious recollection and another
kind that is not."30 This view was gradually expanded into a more
complex array of "systems" of memory, cognitively distinguishable,
and relying upon different structures of the brain. 31 The current
understanding is that memory includes an array of distinctive
processes and systems, involving different neural structures. 32 It has
been suggested that various memory systems evolved because they
serve starkly different purposes.3 3 Nevertheless, the systems of
memory do not operate in isolation-one experience can produce many
forms of memory, and different kinds of memory may recruit
34
overlapping regions of the brain.
The term "declarative" memory was introduced to capture one
system, and "nondeclarative" memory to capture "an umbrella term
referring to several memory systems."35 "Nondeclarative" memory
(also called "implicit" memory) includes:
a large family of different memory abilities sharing one feature in particular. In each
case, memory is reflected in performance-in how we do something. This kind of
as
memory includes various motor and perceptual skills, habits, and emotional learning,
36
well as... habituation, sensitization, and classical and operant conditioning.

Nondeclarative memory is unconscious-it cannot be called to mind. It
is not true or false. Examples include "procedural memory" for skills
and habits (for example, riding a bicycle), "priming" (also called
"perceptual representation," which denotes an increased capacity to

29. Squire, supra note 6, at 171 (noting that Maine de Biran in 1804 "wrote about
mechanical memory, sensitive memory, and representative memory"; William James in 1890
distinguished memory from habit; Henri Bergson likewise made such a distinction; McDougall
(1923), Tolman (1948), Ryle (1949), and Bruner (1969) also drew various distinctions among
different kinds of memory). Note, however, that the earliest theories of memory assumed that it
was a unitary faculty. See S. Matthew Liao & Anders Sandberg, The Normativity of Memory
Modification, 2008 NEUROETHICS 85, 86 & n.2 (citing PLATO, supra note 7).
30. Squire, supra note 6, at 171.
31. See id. at 172, 174.
32. SCHACTER, supra note 8, at 5; see also Squire, supra note 6, at 175 ( "ITihe notion of
multiple memory systems is now widely accepted.").
33. See Squire, supra note 6, at 174 (noting, for example, that "the gradual changes that
occur in birdsong learning are fundamentally different from and have a different function than
the rapid learning that occurs when a bird catches food for later recovery").
34. SQUiRE & KANDEL, supranote 9, at 70.
35. Squire, supra note 6, at 173 (citation omitted).
36. SQUIRE & KANDEL, supra note 9, at 24.
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detect or identify objects after a recent encounter with them3 7 ),
perceptual learning ("an improvement in the ability to discriminate
simple perceptual attributes, such as tones or line orientations, simply
as the result of performing the discriminations repeatedly" 38), simple
classical conditioning, and nonassociative learning. 39
By contrast, "declarative" memory (also called "explicit" or
"conscious" memory") is present in the individual's conscious and can
be intentionally called to mind. It is memory of "knowledge that can
potentially be declared, that is, brought to mind as a verbal
proposition or as a mental image." 40 This is what meant by "memory"
in the colloquial sense. Declarative memory can be further divided
into what is sometimes called "short-term" and 'long-term" memory.
"Short-term" memory denotes the cognitive faculty that retains
information only temporarily until it is forgotten or consolidated into a
more long-term form of storage. 4 1 "Short-term memory" includes
"immediate memory," which captures information that is the object of
current attention (it is thought that for most people, this can include
42
up to approximately seven items, such as a U.S. phone number).
Immediate memory can be retained for several minutes if it rehearsed
actively (for example, repeating a phone number to oneself prior to
dialing). Another form of "short-term" memory is "working memory"a term coined by Alan Baddeley. 43 "Working memory" includes
immediate memory that is retained for several minutes, the
"phonological loop" (which temporarily stores memory of spoken words
and meaningful sounds 44), and the "visuospatial sketchpad" (which
45
stores visual images like faces and spatial configurations).
"Long-term" declarative memory can be divided into "semantic"
and "episodic." "Semantic" memory (a term first discussed at length by

37. Id. at 160.
38. Id. at 164.
39. See id. at 24-25 (discussing nonassociative learning and classical conditioning, a type of
associative learning, as parts of nondeclarative memory).
40. Id. at 70-71.
41. See id. at 84 (describing short-term memory). Squire and Kandel caution against using
the phrase "short-term memory," and prefer to speak in terms of its subdivisions for purposes of

clarity. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 84-85.
45. Id. at 85. Baddeley recently added a fourth element of his model of working memory,
the "episodic buffer," which links information across phonological and visual contexts in
chronological fashion. See generally Alan Baddeley, The Episodic Buffer: a New Component of
Working Memory?, 4 TRENDS COGNrrVE SC. 417 (2000).
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Endel Tulving in 197246), is a-contextual factual knowledge that does
not require remembering any particular past event (for example, the
knowledge that Tyrannosaurus Rex was a carnivore). 47 By contrast,
memory")
is
called
"source
memory
(sometimes
episodic
autobiographical-it pertains to personal, contextual information
gathered directly by the individual through experience, at a particular
place and time. 48 Remembering a trip to Paris requires the exercise of
episodic memory; remembering that Paris is the capital of France
requires semantic memory. Episodic memory "stores spatial and
temporal landmarks that identify the particular time and place when
an event occurred." 49 This form of memory is recently evolved (growing
out of semantic memory). 50 It allows one to re-experience past events
in one's life, and has been likened to a form of time travel.5 1 "The
essence of episodic memory lies in the conjunction of three conceptsself, autonoetic awareness, and subjectively sensed time."52 It is
arguably the richest form of memory and is certainly most directly
relevant to the relationship between memory and punishment.
B. Biological Mechanisms of Memory
There is a vast and rich scientific literature on the biology of
memory. For present purposes, however, it is necessary only to review
briefly the scientific findings most relevant to memory (and its
modification) and punishment. Thus, the following discussion will
focus primarily on the basic biological mechanisms of long-term
declarative memory (with special emphasis on episodic memory), and
will briefly touch on how emotion augments such memory. By
necessity, the discussion to follow will be brief and stated in the
simplest possible terms.

46. Endel Tulving, Episodic and Semantic Memory, in ORGANIZATION OF MEMORY 381, 383
(Endel Tulving & Wayne Donaldson eds., 1972).
47. See id. at 387 (describing, and providing examples of, semantic memory).
48. See generally SQUIRE & KANDEL, supranote 9, at 106 (comparing episodic and semantic
memory).
49. Id.
50. Endel Tulving, Episodic Memory: From Mind to Brain, 53 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 1, 5
(2002).
51. See id. at 2 (comparing recalling memories to time traveling).
52. Id. at 5.
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1. Systems Neuroscience of Long-Term Declarative Memory
'Memory in the biological sense is best understood as the
systems underlying our capacity for retaining, storing, and recalling
experiences."53 Stimuli encountered through the senses activate
networks of neurons throughout the brain.54 As Larry Squire and Eric
Kandel have explained: "In each of the relevant areas, persistent
changes are thought to occur in the strengths of connections among
neurons, and as a result neurons respond differently after learning. It
is thought that the aggregate activity in the collection of altered
neurons comprises the long-term memory of what is perceived." 55 The
strength of connections among neurons is increased through a process
56
called "Long-Term Potentiation" ("LTP").
Neither memory in general, nor long-term declarative memory
in particular, is "stored" in any one particular region of the brain. "The
modern view is that memory is widely distributed but that different
areas store different aspects of the whole." 57 Moreover, declarative
memory of objects appears to be stored in a distributed manner across
those brain regions that are activated while visually perceiving
attributes of such objects in the first instance, including size, color,
shape, and the like. 58 Retrieving declarative memory thus seems to
involve the reconstruction of information (reactivation of the original
59
network) distributed across these brain regions in response to a cue.
But it is not simply the activation of the original network. The
network likewise incorporates new information from the present
environment. Thus, "when we remember, we complete a pattern with
the best match available in memory; we do not shine a spotlight on a
stored picture." 60 Retrieval is likewise affected by emotion, mood, and
61
state of mind.
A key region of the brain for storing long-term declarative
memory is the medial temporal lobe ("MTL"). The MTL is necessary
for the initial encoding of new information, and remains essential for
the consolidation of the memory and its ultimate establishment in the
53. Liao & Sandberg, supra note 29, at 86.
54. See id. (describing chemical processes in the brain).
55. SQUIRE & KANDEL, supra note 9, at 88.
56. See id. at 111 (discussing LTP and its features).
57. Id. at 10.
58. Id. at 72-73.
59. Id. at 74. For additional discussion of retrieval, including the theories of Antonio
Damasio, Morris Moscovitch, and others, see SCHACTER, supra note 8, at 69-73.
60. SCHACTER, supra note 8, at 71.
61. SQUIRE & KANDEL, supra note 9, at 74.
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cortex. 62 Within the MTL, the hippocampus and adjacent cortical
structures6 3 appear to play a significant role in the conversion and
storage of long-term declarative memory. Squire and Kandel offer a
useful framework for understanding this process:
One possibility ... is that, after an event occurs, the [MTL] rapidly stores links or
pointers that connect it with the multiple cortical areas that together store a
representation of the whole event. By this view, the [MTL] is needed initially to support
both storage and retrieval of the event, and it directs the gradual linking together in
cortex of the neuronal ensembles that participate in the memory. Eventually, the
network of interconnected cortical6 4areas is able to support storage and retrieval without
the help of the [MTL] structures.

Thus, the MTL plays a temporary but crucial role in the transition of
declarative memory from short-term to long-term memory. The
observation of patients such as H.M., whose MTL had become
disabled, has confirmed this. H.M. and others like him lost those
memories that had not yet been consolidated into long-term storage in
networks across the cortex, and were unable to form new long-term
memories-a form of anterograde amnesia. Nevertheless, those
memories that had undergone consolidation and relocated to the
cortex (distributed across various networks), or did not otherwise
depend on the MTL (for example, procedural or skills memory)
remained intact.
The foregoing account applies to long-term declarative memory,
including semantic memory. It is thought that episodic memory is
encoded and consolidated in similar fashion, but that it additionally
requires the work of the frontal lobes to store information about where
and when the memory was acquired. 65 Some patients with frontal lobe
damages suffer from confusion about where and when they acquired
certain memories. 66 Endel Tulving describes a patient, "K.C.," who
suffered from extensive brain lesions in cortical and subcortical
regions, including his MTL. 67 K.C.'s semantic memory appeared to be
intact, even regarding aspects of his own life (for example, his address,
the names of schools he attended, the location of his parents' summer
cottage), but he lacked episodic memory. He could not remember any
experiences from his own life, save those occurring in the past minute
or two. "It is apprehension of subjectively experienced time, the

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 83.
The entorhinal, perirhinal, and parahippocampal cortices. Id. at 98.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 106.
Id.
Tulving, supra note 50, at 12-14.
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autonoetic (self-knowing) consciousness, that is grossly impaired." 68

And his impairment was both forward- and backward-looking. He
could not remember his past, nor did he have any conception of what
he would do or experience in the future. The fact that K.C.'s semantic
memory was intact while his episodic memory was decimated strongly
suggests that different brain regions subserve these distinct forms of
memory.
Additional support for the notion that the frontal lobes are
required for episodic memory to a greater degree than semantic
memory comes from functional neuroimaging studies (PET and fMRI)
of healthy adults. Such studies show differential involvement of the
prefrontal cortices in encoding and retrieval of episodic memories.
That is, "left prefrontal cortex is differentially more involved than
right in encoding information into episodic memory, whereas right
prefrontal is differentially more involved than left in episodic memory
retrieval."69 Tulving holds that this empirical regularity, called
"HERA" (hemispheric encoding/retrieval asymmetry), provides
evidence of another biological distinction between episodic and
semantic memory because semantic retrieval (unlike episodic
retrieval) is seldom observed in the right hemisphere. Thus, the two
processes may very well be biologically distinct. 70
2. Molecular Mechanisms of Long-Term Declarative Memory
The transition of short-term memory to long-term memory,
described above, requires anatomical changes in the neurons
themselves. Beginning in the early 1960s, several research scientists
found that the formation of long-term memory in mice (unlike shortterm memory) requires the synthesis of new proteins. 71 They
discovered that interference with protein synthesis shortly after
training severely impaired long-term memory formation. 72 This
suggested that consolidation of short-term memory into long-term
storage involved protein synthesis. Subsequent discoveries as to which
proteins were required and how they were formed came later from
73
study of other animal models, including Aplysia (a marine slug).

68. Id. at 14.
69. Id. at 17.
70. See id. at 18 (summarizing these processes).
71. See SQUIRE & KANDEL, supra note 9, at 132-33 (describing the experiments, which
involved running mice through a T-shaped maze).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 133.
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Study of Aplysia revealed that protein synthesis within a
particular time window is crucial for long-term changes in synaptic
connectivity-strengthening the neural connections that comprise
memory.7 4 Drawing on the work of other molecular biologists,
researchers further surmised that specific genes must be "switched
on" to synthesize the relevant proteins, and thus facilitate long-term
75
memory.
Genes encode the information necessary to produce proteins on
which all biological processes (including memory) depend. Gene
expression (that is, "turning on" or "turning off') determines cellular
specialization: "a kidney cell is a kidney cell and a neuron a neuron"
because they each express a different combination of the genes found
in the nucleus.7 6 In the human brain there are 1011 neurons, composed
of roughly one hundred cell types "that can be distinguished by their
shape and their connections, features determined both by the
distinctive combination of genes expressed within each cell and by the
combination of genes expressed in the target cells with which each cell
type interacts." 77 Gene expression-activation (turning on) and
by
regulated
most commonly
repression (turning off)-is
''
"transcriptional control mechanisms. 78
Regulation of gene expression in this way is crucial to
consolidation of memory from short-term to long-term. Eric Kandel
and colleagues discovered a transcription factor, CREB-1 (cAMPresponse element binding protein-i), that activates some of the genes
necessary to build proteins that support long-term memory. 79 Kandel
likewise discovered an inhibitory transcription factor, CREB-2, that
constrains the actions of CREB-1, and hinders the formation of longterm memory.8 0 Researchers have found that in Drosophila (a fruit
fly), inducing overexpression of CREB-1 greatly enhances formation of
long-term memory, whereas inducing expression of CREB-2 severely
impairs such formation.8 1 The time it takes for genes activated by
CREB-1 to cause the synthesis of the relevant proteins for long-term

74. Id. at 135.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 136.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 139-40 (including a technical discussion of the experiments and the molecular
processes involved). The pages that follow likewise discuss additional epigenetic and genetic
mechanisms of memory.
80. Id. at 140.
81. Id. at 141 (discussing the work of Tim Tully at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory).
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memory marks the period of consolidation.Disruption of this protein
82
synthesis likewise disrupts formation of long-term memory.
What are the epigenetic and genetic mechanisms for long-term
declarative memory? This is a complex question, but for present
purposes it is sufficient to note a key finding of Kandel and others
regarding Long-Term Potentiation ("LTP")-modification of the
synaptic connections in the network of neurons that comprise memory.
In the brain regions necessary for consolidation of long-term
declarative memory (for example, the medial temporal lobe), LTP
depends on mechanisms of gene transcription that increase the
number of synaptic contacts in a manner similar to the process for
consolidation of nondeclarative long-term memory.8 3 For example,
Squire and Kandel note that in the late phase of LTP, "the activity of
CREB-1 in the hippocampus appears to lead to the activation of a set
of immediate response genes, and these genes act to initiate the
growth of new synaptic sites."8 4 Studies involving genetically modified
mice with defects in late phase LTP further revealed the connection to
long-term memory: these mice likewise had normal short-term
memory, but severely impaired long-term memory.8 5 Another research
finding indicates that receptors in the hippocampus for amino acid
derivative NMDA (N-methyl-D-aspartic acid) play a significant role in
synaptic plasticity, LTP, and, by extension, formation of long-term
memory.8 6 Another transmitter receptor crucial in this regard is
which
AMPA
(a-amino-3-hydroxl-5-methyl-isoxazole-propionate),
87
depolarizes NMDA receptors, facilitating the induction of LTP.
Researchers have genetically engineered mice to over-express NMDA
receptors. Such mice have shown superior learning and memory
abilities.88 Likewise, it is thought that drugs that target NMDA

82. Id. at 142.
83. See id. 146-53.
84. Id. at 151.
85. See id. 151-52.
86. See, e.g., Anjan Chatterjee, Cosmetic Neurology: The Controversy over Enhancing
Movement, Mentation, and Mood, 63 NEUROLOGY 968, 970 (2004) (citing John A. Kemp & Ruth
McKernan, NMDA Receptor Pathway as Drug Targets, 5 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE SUPPLEMENT
1039, 1039-42 (2002)).
87. See, e.g., Gary Lynch, Memory Enhancement: The Search for Mechanism-Based Drugs, 5
NATURE NEUROSCIENCE SUPPLEMENT 1035, 1035-38 (2002) (describing the "consensus induction
moder).
88. See Ya-Ping Tang et al., Genetic Enhancement of Learning and Memory in Mice, 401
NATURE 63,63-64 (1999).
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receptors (for example, ampakines, discussed further below) will
promote the acquisition and consolidation of new memories.8 9
Squire and Kandel have offered a useful comparison of the
different molecular mechanisms of storing short-term versus longterm memory:
With both forms of memory [i.e., nondeclarative and declarative], short-term memory is
achieved by modifying pre-existing proteins and strengthening pre-existing connections
through the activity of one or another protein kinase. These short-term forms of memory
do not require new protein synthesis. By contrast, long-term memory requires the
activation of
genes, new protein synthesis, and the growth of new synaptic
90
connections.

Thus, in both declarative and nondeclarative memory, it appears that
consolidation into long-term storage requires anatomical changes that
depend on new protein synthesis-which, of course, depends on
specific genetic and epigenetic mechanisms. For present purposes, this
is an important insight, as many of the novel interventions for
modifying memory make use of this new knowledge.
C. Role of Emotion in Memory
"Emotional Memory" acquired by fear conditioning is not a
form of declarative memory, 91 and relies on different structures of the
brain (for example, the amygdala). 92 Nevertheless, the emotions (and
the brain function that subserves them) play a crucial role in
understanding declarative memory, and, by extension, efforts to
modify it by neurobiological means. As pioneer in the science of
memory and emotion, Joseph LeDoux has noted, "Emotional and
declarative memories are stored and retrieved in parallel, and their
''93
activities are joined seamlessly in our conscious experience.
A surfeit of emotions can directly affect the clarity and
durability of declarative memory. The amygdala, a region of the brain
crucial to emotion, plays "an essential part in modulating the storage

89. See Lynch, supra note 87, at 1035-36 (explaining how certain drugs modulate AMPA
receptors, which depolarize and thus unblock NMDA receptors, thereby inducing LTP).
90. SQUIRE & KANDEL, supra note 9, at 155. Squire and Kandel likewise point out that this
sharing by nondeclarative and declarative memory of a common mechanism for encoding and
consolidation may indicate evolutionary conservation: "they are found in both simple
invertebrates such as Drosophila and Aplysia and complex mammals such as mice." Id.
91. Joseph LeDoux, Emotions, Memory, and the Brain, in THE SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN BOOK
OF THE BRAIN 116, 116 (Antonio R. Damasio ed., 1999).
92. See id.; see also PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 4, at 222 (describing
processes affecting the amygdale).
93. LeDoux, supra note 91, at 116.
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and strength of memories." 94 LeDoux explains: "Emotion is not just
unconscious memory; it exerts a powerful influence on declaratory
memory and other thought processes." 95 In some instances, increased
stress and emotion can enhance declarative memory-the memories
are longer-lived, clearer, and suffused with emotional content.96
Mysteriously, stress and emotion can likewise (and sometimes at the
97
same time) induce retrograde amnesia.
As will be discussed in detail below, these insights about the
relationship between emotion and long-term declarative memory have
been an important foundation for efforts at developing neurobiological
techniques of memory modification.
D. Conclusions
The foregoing (necessarily compressed and basic) discussion of
the biology of memory reveals a number of important conclusions
directly relevant to the project of neurobiological memory
modification. First, there are multiple neurocognitive "systems" of
memory, defined according to function. Second, different regions of the
brain play distinctive roles in encoding, consolidating, and retrieving
memory. Third, memory is encoded and distributed across networks of
neurons. Fourth, the strength of memory, and its consolidation from
short-term to long-term storage, depends on the strength of
connections between neurons in the distributed network. Converting
short-term memory into long-term memory requires changes in
synaptic connections that depend on anatomical changes in the neuron
itself. Fifth, these anatomical changes occur through genetic and
epigenetic mechanisms involving the synthesis of proteins. Sixth, and
finally, the neurobiological processes that subserve emotion, though
distinct from those that support and sustain long-term declarative
memory, nevertheless exert a strong effect on this latter faculty. That
is, the presence of emotion (and the attendant proliferation of stress
hormones throughout the brain) can deepen the clarity and durability
of declarative memory. Alternatively, in some instances, it can induce
retrograde amnesia.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Larry Cahill, Similar Neural Mechanisms for Emotion-Induced Memory
Impairment and Enhancement, 100 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 13,123, 13,123-24 (2003).
97. See id. (discussing B.A. Strange, R. Hurlemann & R.J. Dolan, An Emotion-Induced
Retrograde Amnesia in Humans Is Amygdala- and f-Andrenergic-Dependent, 100 PRoC. NAT'L
ACAD. SCI. 13,626 (2003)).
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All of these scientific findings play a role in present and
projected efforts to modify memory by neurobiological means.
II. NEUROBIOLOGICAL METHODS OF MEMORY MODIFICATION
Memory is a biological process that can be manipulated by
modern biology like anything else. Not only can you disrupt it,
you can improve it. Descartes was wrong.
98
- Dr. Timothy Tully, Founder of Helicon Therapeutics
The revolutionary scientific advances described above have
spurred wide-ranging interest in developing drugs to modify and alter
memory for therapeutic purposes. 99 There are myriad diseases and
disabilities that touch and concern memory. It is estimated that by
2050, over 100 million people will have Alzheimer's disease or other
forms of dementia, and vastly more will suffer from memory decline
associated with aging. 10 0 There is thus a pressing need for medical
interventions that will restore the capacity to remember, or at least
arrest the rate of memory decline. At the other end of the memory
spectrum, the problem of pathologically persistent memories of pain or
fear bedevils the roughly 5.2 million adults who suffer from PostTraumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD") each year. 10 1 These and other
disorders give rise to the need for therapies that will reduce the
incidence of or blunt the anxiety associated with memories that will
not go away. Beyond such patients suffering from serious illnesses and
debilitating conditions affecting memory, there is intense interest
among biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms for the development of
drugs aimed at the wider population who merely seek to remediate
normal forms of forgetfulness:
The big score: treating 76 million middle-aged folks who aren't demented but may
welcome a way to reverse the frustrating forgetfulness that comes with age. "People in
the industry are thinking about it. It would be a huge market, but the drugs would have
to be very safe," says Novartis research chief, Paul Herrling. James McGaugh, a

98. Robert Langreth, Viagrafor the Brain, FORBES, Feb. 4, 2002, at 46.
99. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 87, at 1035-38 ('The emergence of LTP as a widely accepted
substrate of many (though not all) commonplace forms of memory, coupled with rapidly
expanding information on the molecular biology of synaptic plasticity in general, has resulted in
a new effort to invent mechanism-based memory drugs.").
100. Benedict Carey, So You Just Want to Forget? Science Is Working on Eraser,N.Y. TIMES,
April 6, 2009, at Al; see also PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, TAKING CARE: ETHICAL
CAREGIVING IN OUR AGING SOCIETY 7-15, 36 (2005) (discussing the effects of aging and projected
population experiencing such effects).
101. Nat'l Ctr. for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, How Common Is PTSD?, U.S. DEPT. OF
VETERANS AFF., http://www.ptsd.va.gov/public/pages/how-common-is-ptsd.asp (last visited Apr.
4, 2011).
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neuroscientist at the University of California, Irvine, adds: "Drug companies won't tell
people-the 44-yearyou this, but they are really gunning for the market of unimpaired
10 2
old salesman trying to remember the names of his customers."

Development of memory enhancing agents is well underway at
numerous drug companies, including Merck, Johnson & Johnson, and
10 3
GlaxoSmithKline.
Neurobiological techniques for modifying memory are manifold.
The following sections will discuss novel interventions for memory
erasure, "dampening" (that is, modulating the affective content of
memory), and enhancement. Though connected to enhancement, there
will be no discussion of improving executive function related to
memory formation (for example, enhancing attention, concentration,
working memory, and the like). Moreover, there will be no discussion
10 4
of inducing false memories.
A. Memory Erasure
Memory erasure has long captured the imagination of
clinicians, scientists, artists, and the broader public. Novels and films
have taken up the subject, and the real-world accounts of memory loss
have drawn the attention of a wide array of readers and viewers. 10 5
Induction of memory loss is not merely the stuff of fiction. Increased
knowledge of the structure and function of the brain has opened the
door to several different techniques of memory erasure.

102. Langreth, supra note 98.
103. See id. (listing companies, products, and timelines for availability).
104. For a discussion of this topic, see PAUL R. McHUGH, TRY TO REMEMBER: PSYCHIATRY'S
CLASH OVER MEANING, MEMORY, AND MIND 58 (2008) (noting that techniques used to help people
remember events from the past could easily create false memories); Ira E. Hyman, Jr. &
Elizabeth F. Loftus, Errors in Autobiographical Memory, 188 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 933
(1998); Ira E. Hyman, Troy H. Husband & F. James Billings, False Memories of Childhood
Experiences, 9 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 181 (1995); Elizabeth F. Loftus, Creating False
Memories, 277 SCI. AM. 70 (1997); Elizabeth F. Loftus & Jacqueline E. Pickrell, The Formationof
False Memories, 25 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 720 (1995); Daniel L. Schacter & Tim Curran, The
Cognitive Neuroscience of False Memories, 25 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 727 (1995); Yana Weinstein
& David R. Shanks, Rapid Induction of FalseMemory for Pictures, 18 MEMORY 533 (2010).
105. For movies, see, for example, ETERNAL SUNSHINE OF THE SPOTLESS MIND (Anonymous
Content 2004); FIFTY FIRST DATES (Columbia Pictures 2004); MEMENTO (Newmarket Capital
Grp. 2000); MISTER BUDDWING (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1966); PAYCHECK (DreamWorks SKG
2003); REGARDING HENRY (Paramount Pictures 1991); TOTAL RECALL (Carolco Int'l 1990); WO
SHI SHEI [WHO AM I?] (Golden Harvest Co. 1998). For novels, see UMBERTO ECO, THE
MYSTERIOUS FLAME OF QUEEN LOANA (Geoffrey Brock trans., 2005); IAN FLEMING, MOONRAKER
(1955); GABRIEL GARCIA MARQUEZ, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF SOLITUDE (1967); WILLIAM GIBSON,
NEUROMANCER (1984); OLIVER SACKS, THE MAN WHO MISTOOK His WIFE FOR A HAT AND OTHER
CLINICAL TALES (1985).
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It has long been known that electroconvulsive therapy ("ECT")
can induce retrograde amnesia in patients, blocking out memories of
06
events from the past (in some cases many years) prior to treatment. 1
It is equally well known that one side effect of alcohol ingestion can be
anterograde (forward-looking) amnesia. The same is true for certain
common benzodiazepines, such as Valium, Halcion, and Clonazepam,
as well as less common (and indeed, illegal) drugs like Rohypnol (the
"date rape" drug).10 7 Also, anticholinergic 0 8 drugs like atropine or
scopolamine can prevent the formation of new memories in a similar
fashion. 109
More recently, drawing upon new understanding of the
molecular and systems biology foundations of memory, researchers are
exploring new techniques for extinguishing memories. A dramatic and
widely reported array of experiments has raised the possibility of
selectively deleting nondeclarative fear memories. Most involve
animal models. For example, in 2009 researchers reported that, in
mice, selective deletion (using a diphtheria toxin) of neurons that
overexpress CREB "blocked expression of... fear memory" in a way

106. See, e.g., Connie Cahill & Chris Frith, Memory Following Electroconvulsive Therapy, in
HANDBOOK OF MEMORY DISORDERS 319, 327-30 (Alan D. Baddeley et al. eds., 1995) (discussing
memory functioning);
Remembering and Forgetting: Physiological and
retrograde

PharmacologicalAspects: Hearings Before the President's Council on Bioethics (Oct. 17, 2002)
(testimony of James L. McGaugh) [hereinafter Hearings], available at http:/fbioethics.
georgetown.edu/pcbe/transcriptsoct02/session3.html ("I already mentioned that elecroconvulsive
shock will [erase memory]. That's been known since 1949 approximately, and it's known both for
humans and animals that if you give such a treatment, there will be a selective forgetting of
things that have just been learned.").
107. See Hearings, supra note 106 (discussing benzodiazepines); see also Liao & Sandberg,

supra note 29, at 88 (citing D.J. King, Benzodiazepines, Amnesia, and Sedation: Theoretical and
ClinicalIssues and Controversies, 7 HUM. PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY: CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL 79

(1992)); see also id. at 92 (citing A.M. Daderman et al., Violent Behavior, Impulsive DecisionMaking, and Anterograde Amnesia While Intoxicated with Flunitrazepam and Alcohol or Other
Drugs: A Case Study in Forensic Psychiatric Patients, 30 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 238
(2002); A.M. Daderman & L. Lidberg, Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol) Abuse in Combination with

Alcohol Causes Premeditated, Grievous Vwlence in Male Juvenile Offenders, 27 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 83 (1999)).
108. "Anticholinergic" drugs block acetylcholine receptors in the brain. Acetylcholine is a
neurotransmitter that enhances the activity of cortical neurons and promotes memory formation.
Acetylcholine and Memory, CTR. FOR MEMORY & BRAIN PROGRAM IN NEUROSCIENCE,
http://www.bu.edu/hasselmo/ACh.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2011). The neurons that produce
Acetylcholine are some of the first to be damaged by Alzheimer's disease. N. Tabet,

Acetylcholinesterase Inhibitors for Alzheimer's Disease: Anti.Inflammatories in Acetylcholine
Clothing!, 35 AGE & AGEING 336, 336 (2006).
109. See Liao & Sandberg, supra note 29, at 88 (discussing scopolamine and citing J.M.
FUSTER, MEMORY IN THE CEREBRAL CORTEX (1995)); Hearings, supra note 106 (discussing

scopolamine and atropine).
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that appears to be permanent. 10 In 2007, Dr. Todd Sacktor and
colleagues reported that they had successfully erased long-term fear
memories in the mouse brain by interfering with a particular protein
kinase, PKM , simply by injecting a drug (ZIP) into the brain: As
published in Science, inhibiting PKM with a drug caused the erasure
of memories that had been learned a day, or even a month before.
PKM inhibition did not damage the brain and, after the drug had
been eliminated, new long-term memories could be learned and
recalled. Thus PKM is the first functionally important memory
storage molecule.'
The fear memories erased by Dr. Sacktor's team were, in some
cases, three months old (the equivalent of decades-old memories in
humans).1 12 Similarly, in 2008, researchers reported that inhibition of
PKM; in mice had rapidly erased "memories for specific places, both
unpleasant and rewarding, memories for background information,
associations between a sound and a fearful event... and memories for
13
performing a specific action."'
Other researchers have similarly extinguished fear memories
in animals. In 2007, researchers reported successful elimination of a
fear memory through the use of a drug and a technique called
"reconsolidation blockade." As noted above, there is a period between
initial encoding and transfer to long-term storage (consolidation) in
which newly formed memories are fragile. Scientists have found that
memory recall involves a similar process-reconsolidation-in which
memories might be uniquely susceptible to modification: "Later
memory retrieval triggers a new phase of liability, during which the
memory may be updated and stabilized again for long-term
storage."'1 4 Building on this insight, scientists devised a new
technique to selectively erase fear memory. First, they created a fear
memory in rats involving two distinct tones and electric shock. Later,
the researchers injected some of the rats with a drug known to block

110. Jin-Hee Han et al., Selective Erasureof a FearMemory, 323 SCIENCE 1492, 1492 (2009).
111. Reut Shema et al., Rapid Erasureof Long-Term Memory Associations in the Cortex by
an Inhibitorof PKM', 317 SCIENCE 951, 951 (2007). See also Carey, supra note 100 (discussing
PKMK); Todd C. Sacktor, SUNY DOWNSTATE MED. CTR. DEPT. OF PHYSIOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY,
http://www.downstate.edu/pharmacology/faculty/sacktor.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2010) (same).
112. Fred R. Conrad, Erasing Your Memories, N.Y. TIMES: CONSULTS, Apr. 13, 2009,
http://consults.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/13/memory-erasing/. Note, however, that later in the
interview, Sacktor expressed his skepticism that this was a valid analogy. Id.
113. Peter Serrano et al., PKM.' Maintains Spatial, Instrumental, and Classically
ConditionedLong-Term Memories, 6 PLOS BIOLOGY 318, 318 (2008).
114. Valerie Doyere et al., Synapse-Specific Reconsolidationof Distinct Fear Memories in the
LateralAmygdala, 10 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 414, 414 (2007).
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consolidation and reconsolidation (MAPK inhibitor U0126). They then
reactivated the fearful memory in all the rats by replaying one tone
(but not the other). The next day, the researchers found that the rats
receiving the drug were not afraid of the tone that they had recalled
under the influence of the drug, though they retained the fear memory
of the other tone (which they had not recalled while drugged). Thus,
the researchers were able to selectively eliminate a single fear
memory, while leaving closely related memories intact. 115 Researchers
achieved a very similar result using an "inducible and reversible
and fear
chemical-genetic technique" to erase object-recognition
116
memories, while leaving other memories untouched.
Even more recently, Merel Kindt and fellow researchers
induced erasure of a fear memory in human beings using a drug
coupled with reconsolidation blockade. 1 7 The research team
integrated two insights from the science of memory to produce
memory erasure. First, they drew upon the findings, discussed above
(and below), that proliferation of certain stress and emotion-related
neurotransmitters (like norepinephrine) plays an important role
encoding memory clearly and durably. 118 Second, they integrated the
technique of reconsolidation blockade, discussed above.
In the experiment itself, adult volunteers were shown pictures
of two different spiders. The researchers induced a fear memory by
delivering an unpleasant electrical shock with one of the photos.
Eventually, the subjects would have a startle response when shown
that photo, even in the absence of the shock. One day later, some of
the subjects were give propranolol-a B-adrenergic antagonist or "beta
blocker" that inhibits the activation of neurological stress hormone
systems-before reactivating the fear memory by showing the
startling photo of the spider. Some subjects were given propranolol

115. Id.; see also Kerri Smith, Wipe Out a Single Memory, NATURE, Mar. 11, 2007,
(describing the same
http://www.nature.comnews/2007/070305/full/newsO7O3O5-17.html
experiment).
116. Xiahua Cao et al., Inducible and Selective Erasure of Memories in Mouse Brain via
Chemical-GeneticManipulation,60 NEURON 353, 353 (2008).
117. Merel Kindt et al., Beyond Extinction: Erasing Human Fear Responses and Preventing
the Return of Fear, 12 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 256, 256 (2009).
118. See, e.g., Larry Cahill et al., fi-Adrenergic Activation and Memory for Emotional Events,
371 NATURE 702, 702 (1994) ("Substantial evidence from animal studies suggests that enhanced

memory associated with emotional arousal results from an activation of 6-adrenergic stress
hormone systems during and after an emotional experience.'); Larry Cahill & James McGaugh,
Mechanisms of Emotional Arousal and Lasting Declarative Memory, 21 TRENDS IN
NEUROSCIENCES 294, 295 (1998) (discussing the role of stress-related hormones in memory

consolidation).
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without reactivating the memory by viewing the photo. According to
the researchers:
On the third day it was found that the volunteers who had been administered the
propranolol no longer exhibited a fear response on seeing the spider, unlike the control
group who had been administered a placebo. The group that had received propranolol
1 19
but whose memory was not reactivated still exhibited a strong startle response.

The group whose fear response had been eliminated still retained the
episodic memory of the training and the electric shock that
accompanied the one photo. But the nondeclarative fear memory was
erased. 1 0 Apparently, reconsolidating the memory without the stress
hormones (blocked by propranolol) allowed the affective content to be
121
altered.
All of the instances of memory erasure noted above involved
the elimination of a nondeclarative fear memory. What about
declarative memory in general and episodic memory in particular?
Might it ever be possible to directly edit these memories in the same
way? First, as will be discussed further below in the context of
dampening, fear memories-though nondeclarative-exist in a
seamlessly integrated fashion with declarative memories, adding
affective content that deeply influences how such declarative
memories are understood and experienced. Second, editing fear
memory has potentially profound consequences for the remaining
episodic memory of the same event. Some scholars have expressed
optimism that this might be the case. According to one such scholar,
"given the evidence for reconsolidation in a variety of brain systems
and memory paradigms, [reconsolidation-based editing of episodic
memory] appears likely."1 22 Relatedly, in a recently published paper,
119. Spotless Mind? FearMemories in Humans Weakened with Beta-Blocker Propanolol, SCI.
DAILY,Mar. 12, 2009, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/03/090311103611.htm.
120. Id.
121. A very similar result has been achieved using "extinction training" rather than drugs.
See, e.g., Marie-H. Monfils et al., Extinction-Reconsolidation Boundaries: Key to Persistent
Attenuation of Fear Memories, 324 SCIENCE 951, 955 (2009) ("[E]xtinction training applied
shortly after fear conditioning can prevent memory consolidation and the return of fear.");
Gregory J. Quirk & Mohammed R. Milad, Editing Out Fear, 463 NATURE 36, 36 (2010)
(discussing extinction training in rodents and humans); Daniela Schiller & Joshua Johansen,
Prelimbic Prefrontal Neurons Drive Fear Expression: A Clue for Extinction.Reconsolidation
Interactions,29 J. NEUROSCIENCE 13,432, 13,433-44 (2009) (discussing the relation between fear
expression and extinction); Daniela Schiller et al., Preventing the Return of Fear in Humans
Using Reconsolidation Update Mechanisms, 463 NATURE 49, 50-51 (2010) (discussing
reconsolidation following extinction training).
122. Liao & Sandberg, supra note 29, at 88 (citing N.C. Tronson & J.R. Taylor, Molecular
Mechanisms of Memory Reconsolidation, 84 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 262 (2007)). Dr.
Todd Sacktor has noted, "PKM has also been found to maintain long-term memories in the
neocortex, the final repository for many types of memory." Todd C. Sacktor, supra note 111.
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researchers concluded that "new learning impedes the reconsolidation
of neutral autobiographical memories."'123 In that study, researchers
directed subjects to recall (and thus reconsolidate) emotionally
positive, neutral, and negative episodic memories. Shortly thereafter,
the subjects memorized an emotionally disturbing short story. Two
weeks later, the researchers found that the emotionally neutral
"suggesting
markedly
diminished,
were
episodic
memories
reconsolidation blockade in autobiographical memory."'124 Also, James
McGaugh told the President's Council on Bioethics that cortisol (a
stress hormone) can temporarily block declarative memory (as in stage
125
fright).
B. Memory "Dampening"
Memory "dampening' refers to modulation of the affective
content of a declarative memory. As suggested in the above discussion
of the Kindt study, memory dampening might involve the erasure of
an accompanying, parallel, nondeclarative emotional memory. That is,
memory dampening might entail the disaggregation of the declarative
memory of a traumatic event from the attendant emotional memory
that would otherwise give it affective content, deepen it, and make it
more durable.
Larry Cahill and colleagues have explored the relationship
between emotion and declarative memory in humans-identifying the
mechanisms by which stress hormones in the brain increase the
clarity, intensity, and duration of memory.1 26 In an iconic study, he
showed how suppressing the B-adrenergic stress hormones through
the administration of B-blocker propranolol could mute the intensity of
a traumatic memory. 127 The President's Council on Bioethics concisely
described the experiment in the following way:
The researchers showed their subjects a series of slides and told them one of two stories
to explain the events depicted; one story was mundane and emotionally neutral, the
other was tragic and emotionally gripping. Two weeks later, the participants were asked
to recall the story, and those who had heard the emotionally arousing story were found-

123. Lars Schwabe & Oliver T. Wolf, New Episodic Learning Interferes with the
Reconsolidationof AutobiographicalMemories, 4 PLOS ONE e7519, e7519 (2009).
124. Id.
125. Hearings,supranote 106 (discussing glucocorticoids).
126. See, e.g., Cahill et al., supra note 118, at 702 ("Substantial evidence from animal studies
suggests that enhanced memory associated with emotional arousal results from an activation of
6-adrenergic stress hormone systems during and after an emotional experience."); Cahill &
McGaugh, supra note 118, at 410-11 (discussing how emotional arousal influences memory).
127. Cahill et al., supra note 118, at 702-03.
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as expected-to recall what was depicted in the slides in far greater detail than those who
had heard the mundane version. The experiment was then repeated, except that half
the participants were given an injection of the beta-blocker propranolol and half were
injected with a saline placebo one hour before the slide show. What they found was that,
after two weeks, those who had heard the more mundane version of the story had the
same level of recollection regardless of whether they had received the beta-blocker or the
placebo. But of the subjects who had heard the more arousing version of the story, only
those receiving the placebo showed an enhanced level of recollection. Those who heard
the arousing story after receiving the beta-blocker found it extremely sad and emotional
at the time, but two weeks later they remembered
it at the same emotional level as the
12 8
group that had heard the neutral story.

Thus, through the administration of B-blocker propranolol, Cahill and
his team were able to prevent the typical memory-enhancing effects of
emotional arousal. Under the influence of propranolol, subjects
remembered an emotionally arousing story as though it were neutral.
At the same time, propranolol can also preserve memories that would
129
otherwise be erased by stress.
Memory researcher Roger K. Pitman conducted a pilot study
involving sufferers of PTSD. He administered propranolol to patients
six hours following the traumatic event, and for ten days thereafter.
Pitman found that the patients receiving the propranolol exhibited
less pronounced PTSD symptoms when exposed to a re-telling of the
traumatic events.130 Thus, Cahill, Pitman, and others have
demonstrated
that
the
administration
of
B-blockers
contemporaneously with or shortly after a traumatic event can
prevent the formation of emotional memories that adversely color
episodic memories of the same event.
Other researchers (like Kindt, described above) are
investigating the possibility of dampening memory retroactively
through reconsolidation blockade (with propranolol) as a potential
means towards helping people who suffer from PTSD or other
conditions, such as addiction, that are characterized by recurrent
memories that impel them towards harmful behavior.131 Indeed,
several clinical trials are currently underway to test such

128. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 4, at 223.
129. B.A. Strange et al., supranote 97, at 13,626.
130. Roger K. Pitman et al., Pilot Study of Secondary Prevention of Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder with Propranolol,51 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 189, 192 (2002) (noting that the patients
treated with propranolol showed less adverse symptoms in response to "internal cues (i.e.,
mental imagery) that symbolized or resembled the initial traumatic event').
131. E.g., Alain Brunet et al., Effect of Post-Retrieval Propranolol on Psychophysiologic
Responding During Subsequent Script-Driven Traumatic Imagery in Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder, 42 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 503, 503 (2008); Jean Przybyslawski et al., Attenuation of
Emotional and Nonemotional Memories After Their Reactivation:Role of P Adrenergic Receptors,
19 J. NEUROSCIENCE 6623, 6623 (1999).
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interventions. 1 32 As Kindt illustrates, the administration of
propranolol during reconsolidation can mute the emotional content of
traumatic memories.
C. Memory Enhancement
Man is not going to wait passively for millions of years before
evolution offers him a better brain.
133
- Corneliu E. Giurgea
As noted above, the rationale for developing drugs to enhance
memory is primarily for the treatment of patients suffering from
illnesses (such as Alzheimer's disease) or conditions that rob them of
their memory. But there is also much interest in developing agents
that will enhance memory capacities "beyond the normal" for reasons
relating more to desire than clinical need.
Many methods for memory enhancement are under
consideration. One strategy involves the use of drugs called
"cholinesterase inhibitors." Acetylcholine is a neurotransmitter that
enhances the activity of cortical neurons and promotes memory
formation.134 Normally, certain enzymes (acetylcholinesterase)
remove excess acetylcholine from the synapse.
eventually
Cholinesterase inhibitors prevent this process, thus leaving
acetylcholine in the synapse longer. 135 The neurons that produce
acetylcholine are some of the first to be damaged by Alzheimer's
disease. Thus, the primary clinical application for drugs in this
category (for example, Aricept) is to slow the memory loss associated
with that disease. Some researchers report, however, that use of such
drugs can offer memory enhancement in normal adults. In one such
132. See Alain Brunet, Douglas Mental Health Univ. Inst., A Novel Treatment for Chronic
Propranolol,
Using
Post-Reactivation
(PTSD)
Stress
Disorder
Posttraumatic
CLINICALTRIALS.Gov (May 20, 2010), http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT01127568 (describing
ongoing clinical trials); A. Eden Evins, Mass. Gen. Hosp., Memory Reconsolidation Blockade as a
(May 3, 2010),
Novel Intervention for Nicotine Dependence, CLINIcALTRIALS.Gov
http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT00916721 (same); Roger K. Pitman, Mass. Gen. Hosp., A
Psychophysiologic Study of Weakening Traumatic Combat Memories with Post-Reactivation
http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/
27,
2010),
(Apr.
Propranolol, CLiNIcALTRiALs.Gov
NCT00709735 (same).
133. Corneliu Giurgea, Vers une Pharmacologie de l'Activite Integrative du Cerveau:
Tentative du Concept Nootrope en Psychopharmacologie, 25 ACTUALITtS PHARMACOLOGIE 115
(1972) (Fr.), quoted in Rose, supra note 5, at 975.
134. See Acetylcholine and Memory, supranote 108.
135. Tim Tully et al., Targeting the CREB Pathway for Memory Enhancers, 2 NATURE
REVIEWs DRUG DISCOVERY 267, 267 (2003) (discussing the relationship between cholinesterase
and acetylcholine).

1222

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:4:1195

experiment, researchers found that aircraft pilots using the drug
demonstrated a greater ability than the placebo group to retain the
136
capacity to perform a complex set of tasks in a flight simulator.
Another
strategy for memory
enhancement
involves
development of drugs that target the induction of LTP. To understand
how such drugs work, it is necessary to enlarge a bit on the roles of
neurotransmitter receptors AMPA and NMDA, mentioned in Part I.
First, "facilitation of glutamatergic transmission promotes [LTP],
presumed to foster synaptic plasticity and memory formation."'137 As
Gary Lynch has explained:
The consensus induction [of LTP] model involves the two classes of transmitter
receptors co-localized at excitatory (glutamatergic) synapses. AMPA-type glutamate
receptors generate depolarization needed to unblock voltage-sensitive NMDA-type
glutamate receptors, which then admit calcium into the dendritic side of the synapse.
Today, most researchers hold that the enhanced postsynaptic currents that define LTP
expression are caused by changes in AMPA receptors ....138

AMPA receptors depolarize and thus unblock NMDA receptors, which
induces LTP. A class of drugs called "Ampakines" was developed to
modulate AMPA receptors so as to enhance and prolong the synaptic
currents, thus "augment[ing] excitatory transmission in [the]
brain."'139 Such modulation has shown profound effects for the
enhancement of memory of animals across species: "inall, positive
modulation of AMPA receptors reduces the requirement for the
encoding of memory, whether the memory is of a type that normally
persists for only a few minutes or instead normally lasts for an
indefinite period."'140 Ampakines have achieved such memory
enhancement effects in normal humans. 4 1 Other drugs to modulate
AMPA receptors (albeit with different chemical structures than
ampakines) are being explored, including benzothiadiazides and
biarylpropylsulfonamide variants.142 Relatedly, mice genetically
engineered to overexpress NMDA receptors have demonstrated

136. J.A. Yesavage et al., Donepezil and Flight Simulator Performance: Effects on Retention
of Complex Skills, 59 NEUROLOGY 123, 124-25 (2002). A study led by Martha Farah suggests
that even though this does appear to be an effective avenue of memory enhancement for normal
individuals, drug companies prefer to pursue other avenues. Farah et al., supranote 4, at 422.
137. Chatterjee, supra note 86, at 969-70.
138. Lynch, supra note 87, at 1035 (citation omitted).
139. Id. at 1036.
140. Id.

141. Martin Ingvar et al.,
Enhancement by an Ampakine of Memory Encoding in Humans,
146 EXPERIMENTAL NEUROLOGY 553, 553 (1997).

142. See Lynch, supra note 87, at 1036 (discussing these and other drugs as modulating
AMPA receptors).
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strikingly superior learning and memory skills. 143 As for drug
development for human uses, "several companies (Cortex, Lilly,
Organon, Servier) have aligned themselves with particular modulator
strategies, giving the impression that something of a race is on to
144
produce an AMPA receptor-based memory drug."
Other efforts to develop effective memory enhancement focus
on improving consolidation. As discussed above, consolidation of
memory requires protein synthesis, which depends on gene
expression. Recall from the above discussion in Part I that CREB-1 is
a crucial transcription factor that activates genes necessary to build
the proteins that support long-term memory. Researchers have had
much success in enhancing the memory of animal subjects by
to
Drosophilae genetically engineered
CREB-1.
modulating
overexpress CREB-1 demonstrated long-term conditioning to an
aversive stimulus (an odor coupled with a shock) after only one trial
instead of the usual ten trials necessary to condition normal
subjects. 145 Similarly, mice given a drug (rolipram) that augments
CREB- 1 needed only half the trials of normal mice to form a long-term
memory. 46 According to Gary Lynch, "multiple efforts are now
underway to develop drugs that facilitate CREB's contributions to
14 7
long-term memory."
Dr. Todd Sacktor has suggested that his discoveries regarding
the memory-storage function of PKM , might prove useful for
developing memory-enhancement interventions. As noted above,
PKM "maintains synaptic enhancement" crucial to preservation of
long-term memories. Silencing PKM erases memory. Sacktor has
speculated that conversely, increasing PKMK might convert short into
48
long-term memories.
143. Tang et al., supranote 88, at 63.
144. Lynch, supra note 87, at 1036. In 2007 the FDA rejected Cortex Pharmaceuticals' bid to
enter into Phase IIB clinical trials with its AMPA receptor drug CX717 to treat ADHD due to
toxicity concerns. Cortex responded by maintaining it would continue to study the drug's ability
to combat Alzheimer's disease, but the FDA decision caused a fifty-nine percent decrease in
Cortex's stock price. Movers & Shakers, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2007), http://www.marketwatch
.comstory/thursdays-biggest-gaining-and-declining-stocks20071011163900?dist=WSJfeed&siteid=WSJ.
CREB as a Memory Modulator: Induced Expression of a dCREB2
145. See J.C.P. Yin et al.,
Activator Isoform Enhances Long-Term Memory in Drosophila,81 CELL 105, 105 (1995).
146. Tully et al., supra note 135, at 272 fig.3. When tested in humans, rolipram caused
severe nausea and vomiting. Langreth, supranote 98.
147. Lynch, supra note 87, at 1036 (noting that at least two pharmaceutical companies,
Memory Pharmaceuticals and Helicon, are pursuing such drugs).
148. See Conrad, supra note 112 ("Developing memory enhancers that convert short- into
long-term memories by increasing PKMzeta in the brain is also a possibility.").
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Finally, researchers have pursued memory enhancement by
employing the findings of Cahill, McGaugh, and others regarding the
relationship between emotional arousal and memory. If blocking
stress hormones reduces the strength and durability of traumatic
memories, then perhaps amplifying the effect of these same stress
hormones will likewise enhance memory. Rudimentary techniques not
involving drugs seem to confirm this possibility. Larry Cahill
enhances memory by directing human subjects to place their hand in
ice water.149 Similarly, Dr. Robert Jensen achieves memory
enhancement in elderly patients by having them squeeze a hand
dynamometer, which causes the brain to release adrenaline: "[T]hey
found that the memory, squeezing this thing, enhanced memory in the
elderly subjects," though not for those subjects who were taking betablockers. 150 Larry Cahill and James L. McGaugh similarly found that
emotional arousal increases retention of learned stories.151
The stress hormones that enhance and deepen memory are
endogenous, that is, produced by the brain of the subject himself. But,
in principle, it would seem possible to induce such enhancement
through the extrinsic administration of stress hormones directly to the
subject. In 2003, researchers published a paper that involved the
intravenous infusion of epinephrine to human subjects after viewing a
series of slides. Testing recall one week later revealed that those
subjects receiving epinephrine had stronger memories for at least
some of the slides compared with the group of subjects who had
152
received a placebo.
D. Caveats
To responsibly reflect on the challenges of memory modification
to theories of punishment (or any aspect of human life, for that
matter), several caveats are in order. First, it is necessary to keep in
mind that all of the foregoing techniques for erasing, dampening, and
enhancing memory are in their infancy and clinical applications
149. Hearings,supra note 106 ("I know that doesn't sound very sophisticated, but it certainly
gets the heart going, and it releases adrenalin massively right at that time, and Larry Cahill has
now found that memory for ordinary verbal material is significantly enhanced. Subjects learn
something and put their hand in this tub of ice water.")
150. Id.
151. Larry Cahill & James L. McGaugh, A Novel Demonstration of Enhanced Memory
Associated with EmotionalArousal, 4 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 410, 410 (1995).
152. Larry Cahill & Michael Alkire, Epinephrine Enhancement of Human Memory
Consolidation:Interaction with Arousal at Encoding, 79 NEUROBIOLOGY LEARNING & MEMORY
194, 195 (2003).
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remain largely speculative. Targeted and directed memory
modification is not on the immediate horizon. Moreover, the principle
aim of these techniques is to remediate memory defects owing to
diseases or other conditions. The primary purpose is manifestly not to
create superhuman memory in normal people. That said, there is
widespread desire (and thus a very large market) for memory
enhancement in healthy individuals. And the legal framework for "off
label" prescriptions makes it at least possible that once developed,
these drugs would make their way to the general, healthy public. The
widespread use of psychopharmacological drugs such as Ritalin and
153
Prozac offers instructive illustrations in this regard.
Another caveat is that much of the scientific research in this
area has been developed using animal models. While there are
extremely striking and useful similarities (owing to evolutionary
conservation) in the molecular and systems biology of memory among
sea slugs, fruit flies, mice, and humans, caution is in order in taking
the analogies too far. Steven Rose has noted the disappointing results
in translating successful memory enhancement in animals when
generalized to human subjects and has speculated on why this might
be:
There are several possible reasons for this. One is that the biochemical specificity of the
processes that lead to decline in humans might differ from the effects of pharmacological
manipulation in animal models. Perhaps more importantly, assumptions about the
similarity of human memory to animal models of learning and recall (which must
always be tested by the criterion of performance of some task, whether it be maze
navigation or the expression of preference) might be false. Animal models cannot reprise
the subtleties of human verbal, recognition, and autobiographical memory. General
"cognition" is hard to test in animal models (except perhaps in tasks with primates), and
154
memory is but one aspect of cognition in humans.

Thus, one should be cautious in applying the findings of memory
research in animal models, especially for questions involving
declarative (in particular, episodic and semantic) memory.
Also, there is more work to be done in illuminating the
molecular and systems mechanism of memory and its modification. As
Matthew Liao and Anders Sandberg have noted, while much new
153. See, e.g., RICK MAYES, CATHERINE BAGWELL & JENNIFER ERKULWATER, MEDICATING

CHILDREN 1 (2009) (noting that one in every ten to fifteen school-aged children has been
diagnosed with ADHD, and one in every twenty to twenety-five uses a stimulant treatment, such
as Ritalin); LAWRENCE H. DILLER, THE LAST NORMAL CHILD 4-7 (2006) (describing an anecdote
involving an intelligent but absentminded child whose private school teacher insisted on Ritalinbased ADHD treatment instead of more traditional discipline and work management);
LAWRENCE H. DILLER, RUNNING ON RITALIN 97 (1998) (describing the common practice among
some adults of "doctor-shopping" for attention-enhancing stimulants).
154. Rose, supra note 5, at 978.
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knowledge in this regard has been uncovered by the pioneering work
of scientists, there is more to learn. 155 For example, "we still do not
know in general to what extent 'weakening' memory traces are due to
an actual change in the synaptic network underlying the memory, a
loss of retrieval ability or the development of an inhibiting secondary
memory."' 56 Moreover, the interconnectedness of memories and
necessary cues pose serious challenges for memory editing. Also, many
of the techniques of memory modification are insufficiently targeted
157
and selective to be of great use.
All that said, it is still extremely important to understand the
state of memory modification efforts and their potential consequences
for all aspects of human life. Indeed, it is always advisable to explore
the normative issues arising from advance in biotechnology and
biomedical science before they enter routine practice.
III. WHAT IS MEMORY? A HUMANISTIC ACCOUNT
Memory... would come like a rope let down from heaven to
draw me up out of the abyss of not-being ....
-

Proust

58

A crucial step towards understanding the relationship between
memory and punishment is to reflect briefly on the role of memory in
human life more generally, both as an individual and collective
matter. Memory-including the activities of encoding, remembering,
and forgetting' 59-is indispensible to the essential and distinctive
activities of human life as such.
A. Memory and the Individual
On an individual level, memory is crucial to life as humanly
lived. The abilities to encode and remember undergird our capacities
to learn, reason, and make decisions. Memory permits the gathering
and retention of basic skills necessary to daily life. 16 It allows the

155. Liao & Sandberg, supranote 29, at 89.
156. Id.
157. See id.
158. MARCEL PROUST, A LA RECHERCHE Du TEMPS PERDU [REMEMBRANCE OF THINGS PAST] 4

(1927).
159. The following discussion will focus almost entirely on declarative memory-episodic and
semantic.
160. Rose, supra note 5, at 975 ("Our personal memories-the autobiographical record-are
in many ways what define each of us as individuals. And in an increasingly skills-driven and
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individual to formulate and pursue future plans, and avoid past
mistakes. Indeed, "memory is central to human flourishing...
precisely because we pursue happiness in time, as time-bound
beings."1 61 The ability to forget facilitates abstraction from one's
experiences and discrimination between important and trivial
information. Without the ability to forget, one would be like Borges's
fictional character, Funes the Memorious, who famously described his
perfect memory as a "garbage heap-it's all there."162 Similarly,
patient "A.J." described his perfect recall in the following way:
'Whenever I see a date flash on the television (or anywhere else for
that matter) I automatically go back to that day and remember where
I was, what I was doing, what day it fell on and on and on and on...
It is nonstop, uncontrollable and totally exhausting."' 63 William
James, one of the founders of modern psychology, likewise observed
164
that remembering everything is as useless as remembering nothing.
More fundamentally, memory is crucial to the integration and
awareness of one's personal identity. 65 It allows an individual to
understand himself as a unitary being that persists over time. That is,
it allows him to conceive of himself as having a past, present, and
socially interactive world, memory-individual or technologically enhanced-is one of the keys to
success.").

161. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 4, at 215--16.
162. JORGE LuIS BORGES, Funes the Memorious, in LABYRINTHS: SELECTED STORIES AND
OTHER WRITINGS 63-64 (Donald A. Yates & James E. Irby eds., New Directions 1964) (1962),
quoted in Hearings, supranote 106.
163. Kolber, supra note 4, at 1568 (quoting Elizabeth S. Parker et al., A Case of Unusual
AutobiographicalRemembering, 12 NEUROCASE 35, 35 (2006)).
164. "Selection is the very keel on which our mental ship is built. And in the case of memory
its utility is obvious. If we remembered everything, we should on most occasions be as ill off as if
we remembered nothing." JAMES, supra note 16, at 680, quoted in Cahill & McGaugh, supranote
118, at 294.
165. To be sure, the "problem of personal identity" is a very ancient and vexed philosophical
question. Philosophers have long argued about whether or not personal identity can be defined
exclusively and reductively according to physical and/or psychological criteria. A full exploration
of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article. For an introduction to the manifold approaches to
personal identity, see, for example, Dresser, supra note 2, at 397-410 (discussing various
reductive and nonreductive theories of personal identity (including the works of Parfit,
Descartes, Hume, Kant, Locke, Nagel, and others) with accompanying citations to original
sources). See also David Wasserman, Making Memory Lose Its Sting, 24 PHIL. & PUB. POLY Q.
12, 13 (2004) (discussing the work of David DeGrazia and Hilde Nelson on the concepts of
narrative identity and numerical identity). This Article makes a more modest claim, namely,
that personal identity self-understood depends in crucial ways upon memory. Moreover, the
Article follows Ross Poole's insight that while memory may or may not be a self-sufficient ground
of identity (Poole seems certain that it is not), "it remains an inescapable part of the process
through which we claim or accept the burdens of responsibilities, rights, and privileges, of any
complex form of human existence. As such, it is an essential part of moral life." Ross Poole,
Memory, History and the Claims of the Past, 1 MEMORY STUD. 149, 156 (2008).
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future. 166 Indeed, the individual's very concept of "self' depends on
holding together the past in continuity with the present. German
physiologist, Ewald Hering, famously noted that "memory collects the
countless phenomena of our existence into a single whole... our
conscious would be broken up into as many fragments as we had lived
1 67
seconds but for the binding and unifying force of memory."
Augustine likewise invokes vivid imagery to capture this function of
memory, writing that in the "huge hall of my memory ... I met with
myself; I recall what, when, and where I did something and in what

way I was affected when I did

it."168

The relationship between personal identity and memory is
likewise illustrated by instances of memory's failure or eradication. As
Gilbert Meilaender has noted, the sixth book of Virgil's Aeneid offers
one rich example in this regard. There, Aeneas seeks out his father,
Anchises, in the underworld. When they meet, Anchises explains to
Aeneas that the souls that will be reincarnated first drink from Lethe,
the river of forgetfulness, to erase all memory of their past lives:
"Souls for whom / A second body is in store: their drink / is water of
Lethe, and it frees from care / In long forgetfulness / That there
unmemoried they may see again / The heavens and wish re-entry into
bodies."16 9
Here it is clear that the erasure of all memory, among other
things, amounts to the annihilation of identity. Indeed, the Greek
word "lethe" (XiirnD means "oblivion.' 170 The souls described by
Anchises who are later "re-membered" with new bodies are, in fact,
171
new and distinct individuals.
The famous case of "Jimmie" described by Oliver Sacks in "The
Lost Mariner," further illustrates the connection between memory and
identity, albeit in a different fashion. Jimmie suffered from both
retrograde and anterograde amnesia. That is, when he met Dr. Sacks
in 1975, he had virtually no recollection of past events after 1945 (a
166. See, e.g., John Sutton, Memory, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward
("fAin
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum201O/entries/memory/
N. Zalta ed., 2010),
understanding of memory is likely to be important in making sense of the continuity of the
self ...").
167. SQUIRE & KANDEL, supra note 9, at 1.
168. AUGUSTINE, supra note 7, bk. 8.
169. VIRGIL, AENEID 170 (Patric Dickinson trans., Penguin Putnam 2006), quoted in Gilbert
Meilaender, Why Remember?, FIRST THINGS, Aug./Sept. 2003, at 20, 23.
170. H.G. LIDDELL & ROBERT ScoTr, AN INTERMEDIATE GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON 470-71

-(2003).
171. That said, Anchises's larger point is to show Aeneas his descendants. So, there may be a
certain sense in which those souls observed in the underworld are connected to their later selves.
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limited kind of retrograde-backwards-looking-amnesia). Moreover,
Jimmie could not form new memories lasting longer than a few
seconds (a profound form of anterograde-forward lookingamnesia). 172 Jimmie could remember the end of World War II and his
plans for the future at that time. He could remember autobiographical
information predating 1945, including his hometown, military service,
and the like. He retained the ability to communicate using Morse Code
and was adept at puzzles that could be solved quickly. But his
personal identity was permanently frozen in time. For Jimmie, he was
still a nineteen-year-old living in the year 1945. Though he had new
experiences, none could be retained or integrated into his selfunderstanding. Moreover, Jimmie had no ability to recognize his
condition. It was impossible to explain his condition to him in a
manner that he could retain. Thus, Jimmie's defect of memory
radically altered his personal identity as he understood it. Jimmie's
"self' was defined (and disrupted) by the limits of his memory. Crucial
aspects of his "self' were irretrievably lost. Sacks captured the deep
and in this case tragic connection between memory and identity here
illustrated when he wrote: "If a man has lost a leg or an eye, he knows
he has lost a leg or an eye; but if he has lost a self-himself-he

cannot know it, because he is no longer there to know it.

'17

Memory also supports and sustains the narrative quality of an
individual's life. As Gilbert Meilaender has written, "each present
moment is a 'tensed' present. It stretches out in two directionsincorporating the past and reaching out towards the future. Each
moment, therefore, contains a narrative in miniature, and every life is
a story whose plot may be partially hidden in the present." 174 The
above discussion of reincarnation of souls in the Aeneid and the case of
Jimmie both show that memory holds together discrete moments of
experience in a continuous and intelligible narrative. Moreover, as
Meilaender likewise points out, the integration and continuity made
possible by memory also (after the passage of time) allow for the
possibility of contextualizing and understanding experiences as part of
life's larger story. 175 For example, with time and reflection (enabled by
memory), originally painful (or even shameful) experiences can be

172. Meilaender, supra note 169, at 23-24.
173. SACKS, supra note 105, at 35-36.
174. Meilaender, supra note 169, at 22 (quoting Stephen Crites,
Experience, 39 J. AM. ACA. REL. 291, 301 (1971)).
175. Meilaender, supra note 169.
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understood as ultimately redemptive. 176 As the President's Council on
Bioethics observed:
Our experiences at age sixteen will have a different meaning to us when remembered at
age eighteen, and a very different meaning yet again when remembered at age fifty. As
we grow older, memories become less vivid, but perhaps their significance becomes more
clear; although they are less immediate, they are now part of the larger story of who we
meaning of remembered events and, as a result,
are. We can consciously re-examine1 7 the
7
change how they are remembered.

Memory thus allows for the possibility of integrating and attaching
meaning to the myriad experiences within the larger narrative of an
individual's life. Memory thus allows one, in the words of the
President's Council on Bioethics, to "give new meaning to old
'178
happenings.
The attachment of meaning to painful past experiences within
life's larger narrative can serve an important adaptive function. The
case of the Piper Alpha disaster-involving a major fire on a North
Sea oil rig-provides an instructive example in this regard. There, two
sets of rescuers were sent in to retrieve the badly burned and
mutilated bodies of the victims. 7 9 One set of rescuers was attended by
psychiatrists who continually reinforced the narrative that the work
being done, while gruesome and horrific, was crucially important to
the surviving loved ones: "[it was] stinking, dirty, violent work, but it
[meant] something to somebody else."' 8 0 The other set was simply sent
in to do the work without the reinforcement of this redemptive
narrative. The team members able to contextualize their own painful
memories within this redemptive story were able to recover
18 1
emotionally more quickly and fully than those who could not.
Without memory, this adaptive process is not possible. In the film

176. Meilaender argues further that this insight counsels extreme caution in preemptively
erasing or dampening memories before their full meaning can be understood. Id. at 23 ("If, on the
contrary, we know ourselves as bodies who live in time, whose lives must have a narrative
quality but who cannot know the end or full meaning of our life story, then our task is not to
erase memory but to connect and integrate memories-to live the story as best one can who does
not yet know how the plot will work out.!).
177. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supranote 4, at 215.
178. Id.
179. D.A. Alexander, Psychiatric Intervention after the Piper Alpha Disaster, 84 J. ROYAL
SOC'Y MED. 8, 8-9 (1991); D.A. Alexander & A. Wells, Reactions of Police Officers to Body
HandlingAfter a Major Disaster: A Before and After Comparison, 159 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 547,
547-48(1991).
180. Beyond Therapy: Better Memories: Hearings Before the President's Council on Bioethics
(Mar. 6, 2003) (testimony of Paul McHugh), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe
transcripts/march03/session4.html.
181. Alexander, supra note 179, at 11; Alexander & Wells, supranote 179, at 552.
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Memento, the protagonist (who suffers from severe anterograde
amnesia) pointedly asks, "How am I supposed to heal if I can't feel
82
time?"1
While remembering is integral to adaptation and preservation
of coherence in life's narrative, so too is forgetting. Indeed, Daniel
Schacter---one of the foremost researchers on the science of memoryhas argued that the "sins" of memory connected to forgetting are "byproducts of otherwise desirable and adaptive features of the human
mind."'183 Forgetting (in the right measure) allows the pruning of

inessential experiences from the individual's story. 184 The inability to
forget properly (or, put another way, the problem of remembering too
much) can "engulff ] us in trivia or imprison[ ] us in the past."'8 5 At an

extreme, the failure of forgetting can lead to crippling obsession-the
constant re-experiencing of past events. This is one of the tragic
features of PTSD.186 One sufferer of PTSD described the horror of this
condition stating that she would "sell [her] soul to the devil himself to
187
be rid of [her] 24/7 hellish flashbacks and night terrors."
B. Memory and the Other
The above discussion reflects on the role of memory and human
life as individually lived. But persons are not atomized units
disconnected from others. Human beings exist in community-in a
particular social context. Here, too, memory plays an indispensible
role in integrating and sustaining life as humanly lived as a collective
matter. 'Much of our moral and social life depends on the peculiar
ways in which we are embedded in time."' 8 8 We rely on the memories
of those closest to us for an account of our lives at its earliest stages,
before we could form durable memories. 8 9 Later, "as we acquire a
182. MEMENTO, supra note 105, quoted in Meilaender, supra note 169, at 20.
183. Hearings,supra note 106 (testimony of Daniel L. Schacter).
184. Rose, supra note 5, at 976 ('CThe psychological mechanisms of perceptual filtering, and of
short-term, recognition and working memory, are clearly beneficial in blocking the accumulation
of irrelevant or transiently required information in longer term stores.").
185. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 4, at 219.
186. Kolber, supra note 4, at 1568-69 ("A person may be diagnosed with PTSD after
experiencing at least one traumatic event that has given rise to a cluster of symptoms which
typically include 'recurrent and painful reexperiencing of the event, phobic avoidance of traumarelated situations and memories, emotional numbing and withdrawal, and hyperarousal.' ").
187. Id. at 1565 (quoting Lisa, Posting to COGNEWS (Mar. 7, 2005, 5:13 A.M.),
http://cognews.com/1072217907/index- html#1109285564).
188. Sutton, supra note 166.
189. PAUL RICOEUR, MEMORY, HISTORY, AND FORGETTING 132, quoted in Charles Reagan,

Reflections on Paul Ricoeur's Memory, History, and Forgetting,49 PHIL. TODAY 309, 311 (2005)
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memory, we learn what it is that we have to remember."'190 Our
memories are continually formed, shaped and reinforced in
conjunction with those of our close relations. 191 We likewise have a
profound interest in how we are remembered by others after we have
192
passed away.
At the most basic level, memory makes possible symbolic
communication, which in turn enables social arrangements. More
deeply, memory undergirds and sustains our deepest attachments.
The capacity to remember is necessary for loyalty, empathy, and
gratitude. It allows us to honor and memorialize those whom we love
or admire. Strong bonds of memory are a crucial feature of the closest
human relationships. Hebrew University Professor Emeritus of
Philosophy, Avishai Margalit, has noted that "memory is the cement
that holds thick relations together."' 93 The prophet Isaiah, in one of
the most evocative passages in the Old Testament, captures this role
of memory in the kinship between mother and child and God and the
Chosen People: "Can a mother forget the baby at her breast and have
no compassion on the child she has borne? Though she may forget, I
will not forget you!"' 94 According to Margalit, "a conditional sense of
memory is necessary for caring."' 95 Conversely, defects of memory can
distort and even annihilate our deepest and most dearly held
connections with others. The heartbreaking stories of dementia
erasing a patient's memory of his wife or children confirm that this is
SO.196

("It is they who have the memories of my birth, which, by the way begins my personal existence
as a member of a community.").
190. See Poole, supra note 165, at 155 ("We learn to remember aspects of our own past only
insofar as we learn that certain public objects and practices represent a past that is common to
those we are interacting with. It is only by learning to place our experience in the framework of
collective memory that we are able to remember our own past.").
191. See, e.g., MAURICE HALBWACHS, ON COLLECTIVE MEMORY 38 (1992) ("It is in society that
people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, and localize their
memories."). Halbwachs argued that memories are, in fact, not possible outside of the group
context. Id.
192. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 344 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Nancy Cruzan's interest in life, no less than that of any other person, includes an
interest in how she will be thought of after her death .... ").
193. AVIsHAi MARGALIT, THE ETHICS OF MEMORY 8 (2002). Here, Margalit distinguishes
"morality" (which governs remote or "thin" relationships among people, and concerns itself with
basic human obligations owed to all) and "ethics" (which regulates close or "thick" relationships
and concerned with matters such as loyalty and betrayal). Id.
194. Isaiah 49:15 (New International Version).
195. MARGALIT, supra note 193, at 30.
196. Cf. DAVID SHENK, THE FORGETTING 104-07 (2003) (describing Ralph Waldo Emerson's

inability to remember his wife's name).
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The remembrance of names plays a special role in human
relationships. 197 As Margalit observes, Edward Albee's work, The Play
about the Baby, illustrates this by negative contrast, portraying the
absurdity of a son who forgets his mother's name. 198 Similarly, David
Edgar's play, Pentecost, presents the horrifying circumstance of
starving children en route to a concentration camp eating their own
cardboard nametags, effectively erasing any trace of their existence. 199
Likewise, the Book of Deuteronomy includes examples of the role of
names in this form of double killing: "And the Lord shall blot out the
name from under the heaven."2 00
Memory allows us to make and keep promises. Conversely, it
permits us to hold others to their promises, and vice-versa. Memory
enables altruism-it empowers us to "transcend our own perspectives
and interests" by preserving in mind our relationships and
commitments to others that "are not defined by the intensity of
present experience. 2 °1
Memory also allows us to confess and make amends for the
wrongs we do to others, and to demand justice from those who do
wrong to us. The capacity to forget aspects of the past (or remember
them in a different way) is deeply connected to the power to forgive
others. Forgiveness is, of course, mysterious and has been
conceptualized in different ways as a response to the memory 2of
02
grievances-blotting out, covering up, bearing, or cancelling a debt.
Avishai Margalit has described forgiveness as "exclusionary reason,
... a reason for acting against certain reasons." 20 3 No matter how
forgiveness is conceived, however, it is clear that the inability to
modulate the emotional content of the memory of an affront severely
197. See, e.g., MARGALIT, supra note 193, at 21 (describing Edgar's play and noting the
"memory of personal names as referring to the essence of human beings in a way nothing else
does').
198. Id. at 26-27.
199. Id. at 20-21.
200. Deuteronomy 29:20, cited in MARGALIT, supra note 193, at 21.
201. Poole, supranote 165, at 154.
202. MARGALIT, supra note 193, at 185-86. Margalit contrasts the Biblical conceptions of
God's forgiveness (salakh-perhaps meaning "to wash"-which is described as "forgetting") with
that of man's (nasa-meaning "to bear). Id. Meilaender likewise recalls this distinction.
Meilaender, supra note 169, at 22 ("[Ihe prophet Ezekiel describes the restored and
reconstituted Israel-in which, presumably, God will no longer remember Israel's sin-Israel's
own task is described quite differently. 'Then you will remember your evil ways, and your deeds
that were not good.' "). One might wonder what "forgetting" means in the case of God, if one
assumes that God lives outside of, and is not bound by time.
203. MARGALIT, supra note 193, at 202 (quoting JOSEPH RAz, PRACTIcAL REASONS AND
NORMS (2d ed. 1999)).
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That is, if one acutely re-

experiences the humiliation or pain of the offense whenever the
memory comes to mind, it is unlikely that he will be able to forgive
successfully. We are well familiar with stories of too much memory in
this sense, in which families and relationships are forever destroyed
by disordered and persistent memories of grievances suffered. 20 5 In
this way, overly vivid memory of the pain of an offense keeps
resentment alive and, at an extreme, "breathes revenge." 20 6 Margalit
argues persuasively that successful forgiveness requires "the
overcoming of resentment" that attends the memory of the wrong
20 7
done.
One key to successful forgiveness may be our own memory of
wrongs that we have done to others, our imperfections, and desire for
forgiveness-which, in turn, supports empathy for those who have
hurt us. Similarly, the capacity to let go of the painful emotions
associated with our memory of wronging others is integral to accepting
their forgiveness for our faults. George Elliot captures this notion
vividly in Book 6 of Middlemarch:
With memory set smarting like a reopened wound, a man's past is not simply a dead
history, an outworn preparation of the present: it is not a repented error shaken loose
from life: it is a still quivering part of himself, bringing shudders and bitter flavours and
208
the tingling of a merited shame.

Reflecting on the relationship between remembering, forgetting, and
forgiveness reveals a deep connection between emotion, memory, and
moral judgment.
C. Memory and the Polity
Memory does not merely enable and sustain social interactions
among individuals on a small or intimate scale. Memory is also
integral to the life of a polity. Just as for the individual, the shared (or

204. See, e.g., id. at 205 ("[A]s long as the offended one retains any scars from the injury, the
forgiveness is not complete.").
205. Cf. OTIs K. RICE, THE HATFIELDS AND THE MCCOYS 1 (1978) (noting that the famous

feud between the Appalachian Hatfield and McCoy families did not end until the parties ceased
open hostilities and "both families chose to forget an ugly chapter in their history"); WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 1, Prologue ('Two households, both alike in dignity,/ In
fair Verona, where we lay our scene,/ From ancient grudge break to new mutiny,/ Where civil
blood makes civil hands unclean .... ).
206. MARGALIT, supra note 193, at 5.
207. Id. at 208.
208. GEORGE ELIOT, MIDDLEMARCH, 616-17 (Folio Soc'y 1972) (1871).
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"collective" 209) memory of a people is crucial to defining and preserving
its identity: its origins, its boundaries of membership, the goods it
holds most dear, its *obligations in justice to others, its demands for
justice from others, its accomplishments, its failures, atrocities
suffered and perhaps committed, and even its animating purpose and
future goals. In the words of one commentator, "it is through a
narrative that the identity of a country or people, or an individual is
constructed." 210 Shared or collective memory--"the stories a society
tells about momentous events in its history, the events that most
profoundly affect the lives of its members and arouse their passions
for long periods"2 1 1-creates and sustains this narrative. Moreover,
collective memory is normative. As Ross Poole has written, it has a
"teleological character" and "sets the moral agenda" for the polity or
nation in question:
It is because certain things were done or not done in the name of the group that its
present members, the we who make up the group, now have a responsibility to do
carry out the commitments made in the past, or perhaps to
certain things-perhaps2 1to
2
compensate for wrongs.

In this way, collective memory of the past transmits present
21 3
responsibilities.
Collective memory exists first and foremost, of course, in the
minds of the individual members of a polity. Indeed without individual
recollection, there would be no common or shared memory. 21 4 That
said, there are external repositories of shared memory-"[t]he
209. The term "collective memory" is originally attributed to Emile Durkheim, who wrote
about social practices and rituals, and was used by Durkeim's student, Maurice Halbwachs
(1877-1945). See, e.g., Jeffrey K. Olick, Collective Memory, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
SOCIAL SCIENCES 7, 7 (William A. Darity ed., 2d ed. 2008). The term "collective memory" has been
used in a variety of ways, and has been described as a "woolly concept," capable of bearing
multiple meanings. Mark Osiel, Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 475 n.48 (1995). Along with Osiel, this Article will use the phrase
pragmatically to denote "an ideal type, for its heuristic value alone." Id. "Collective memory"
need not be first-person memory; indeed, it rarely is. It is more properly understood, in the words
of Osiel, as the "memory of memory." Id.; see also MARGALIT, supra note 193, at 58-63 (making
the same distinction).
210. Reagan, supra note 189, at 311.
211. Osiel, supra note 209, at 475. Here, shared or collective memory is distinguished from
"history." For extended reflections on the distinctions between shared memory, history, and
related concepts, see generally Olick, supra note 209 (discussing memory, history, mnemohistory,
social memory studies, and the like); Poole, supra note 165 (discussing-and offering a qualified
defense to--the challenges of historians to the epistemic status of shared or collective memory).
212. Poole, supra note 165, at 159.
213. Id.
214. See EVA BRANN, WHAT, THEN, Is TIME? 168 (1999) (asserting that "our common social
memory... requires individual recollections').
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identified visible remains from sherds to monuments, together with
the surviving tales, accounts and documents, and the histories later
based on them. '2 15 Eva Brann calls this "external memory. ' 216 Pierre
Nora captured this material aspect of shared memory with his
21 7
evocative phrase, lieux des memoires ("places of memory").
Examples abound. 21 8 Jews pray and mourn the destruction of the
Temple at the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem. Fans in the United States
sing the national anthem before many sporting events. Rituals such as
funerals, weddings, and the celebration of national holidays are "social
repetitions of memories." 21 9 Even the law itself is both a product and a
reflection of shared memory. As Oliver Wendell Holmes observed, "the
law embodies the story of a nation's development through many
centuries." 220 The U.S. Constitution is a key locus of shared memory
(though the content and present relevance of that memory is the
subject of spirited debate among scholars and jurists).
It is evident from the foregoing that collective memory creates
and sustains the identity of a people-it "provides a narrative of
struggle and achievement, victory and defeat, in which the members
of the group can find their present identity. '221 It is a source of
solidarity, connection, and purpose. That said, there is a dark side of
collective memory. When a persistent collective memory of grievance
and humiliation is attended by raw and powerful emotions, a thirst for
vengeance and violence often quickly follow. Such memories can
distort and disfigure the life of entire nations, fueling perpetual cycles
of revenge. As reporter Michael Ignatieff observed, in such states (for
example, the former Yugoslavia) there is great temporal
disorientation:
[Tihe past continues to torment because it is not the past. These places not living in a
serial order of time but in a simultaneous one, in which the past and present are a
continuous, agglutinated mass of fantasies, distortions, myths, and lies. Reporters in the
Balkan wars often observed that when they were told atrocity stories they were

215. Id. at 167.
216. Id.
217. The materiality of shared memory is related to what some have termed "extended mind
theory." See Poole, supra note 165, at 163 n.4 (discussing the theory of Andy Clark and others
that "insofar as external objects ... play precisely the same role as an 'internal object,' . . . then

for that reason they must also be counted as mental.").
218. See, e.g., id. at 151 ("[Clultural memory exists in artifacts, such as monuments, in
rituals and other social practices, in codes of dress and behavior, and in a range of other social
objects. It also exists in the rhetoric of politicians, editorials, opinion makers and those
attempting to mobilize public opinion in one direction or another.').
219. Reagan, supra note 189, at 310.
220. OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES, THE COMMON LAw 1 (ABA Classics 2009) (1881).
221. Poole, supra note 165, at 158-59.
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occasionally uncertain whether these stories had occurred yesterday, or in 1941, 1841,
or 1441 ... [This] is the dreamtime of vengeance. Crimes can never safely be fixed in
the
222
historical past; they remain locked in the eternal present, crying out for vengeance.

Indeed, it has been written that for many Serbs, simply seeing "1389"
written in graffiti-the year of their loss of the Battle of Kosovo to the
Turks-is enough to provoke a profound sense of humiliation and rage
even today. 223 Thus, persistent shared memories combined with strong
emotions can lead to devastating consequences for a people, internally
and externally.
At the same time, failing to remember injustices committed
either against or in the name of a people (with the attendant
appropriate sense of indignation or shame) can be equally corrosive to
the life of a people. As Martha Minow has written, such forgetting
"implies no responsibility and no commitment to prevent inhumanity
in the future. '224 To drive the point home, she invokes the Russian
proverb: "Dwell on the past and you will lose an eye. Forget the past
and you will lose both eyes. '225 This insight elucidates the tension and
animosity that attended the "Historian's debate" between Jurgen
Habermas and certain conservative German historians about whether
and how to contextualize the Holocaust compared with other
twentieth century atrocities. It was a debate, it turns out, not merely
over an academic question, but rather about the memory and identity
of German people in light of their nation's shared culpability for the
226
gross injustices perpetrated by the Nazis.
Given its potential to unify or divide, it is not surprising that
governments regularly take steps to steward and shape shared
memory. This is particularly true of those governments whose
legitimacy is grounded in past events. 227 President Lincoln invoked

222. Michael Ignatieff, The Elusive Goal of War Trials, HARPER'S, Mar. 1996, reprinted in
Michael Ignatieff, Articles of Faith, Index on Censorship, HARPER'S, Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 15-17,
quoted in MARTHA MINOW, BREAKING THE CYCLES OF HATRED 28 (2003).
223. MARGALIT, supranote 193, at 97.
224. MINOW, supra note 222, at 28. Minow argues that official forgiveness in the form of
amnesty can promote such destructive forgetting. Charles Reagan interprets Paul Ricoeur to
agree at least in part, writing that "[a]mnesty ... sacrifices truth on the alter [sic] of state
rationalization" and connecting "amnesty" etymologically with "amnesia." Reagan, supra note
189, at 314 (construing RICOEUR, supra note 189).
225. MINOW, supranote 222, at 16 (citation omitted).
226. For further discussion of this debate, see Poole, supra note 165, at 161-62 (giving an
overview of the debate between Jurgen Habermas and conservative German historians).
227. See MARGALIT, supra note 193, at 12-13.
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the "mystic chords of memory" as part of his call to unify the nation in
228
his First Inaugural Address.
When regimes transition from an authoritarian to a democratic
form of government, the citizenry often needs to address the crimes of
the past. One technique, for better or worse, has been a kind of
communal decision to forget. Examples of this include the shredding of
some portion of the Stasi files following German reunification 229 and
the censorship of memories of Vichy France by DeGaulle 230 (which one
historian described not so much as "forgetting" as an implicit
agreement "not to tear one another apart"231). By contrast,
governments sometimes also take special care to preserve certain
important shared memory. For example, some countries (including
Italy, Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, and
Switzerland) have criminalized "negationism"-denial of the
Holocaust. 232 Other regimes (for example, South Africa) have used
mechanisms such as Truth and Reconciliation Commissions to
unearth and preserve the memory of past crimes by the predecessor
regime in a manner that is meant to do justice while allowing for the
possibility of a modus vivendi for survivors and their former
233
oppressors.
There are, of course, many tragic examples of regimes
manipulating and abusing memory for sinister and illegitimate ends.
In the face of flagging legitimacy, governments sometimes respond "by
propagating fictional pasts and a sense of their institutions'
ancientness." 234 Orwell captured this tendency in this chilling passage
from his iconic novel, 1984:
And if the facts say otherwise, then the facts must be altered. Thus history is
continuously rewritten... The mutability of the past is the central tenet... Past
events.., have no objective existence, but survive only in written records and in human
memories. The past is whatever the records and the memories agree upon. And since the
Party is in full control of all records ...it follows that the past is whatever the Party
chooses to make it... [W]hen [the past] has been recreated in whatever shape is needed

228. President Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), available at
http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres31.html.
229. See MARGALIT, supra note 193, at 13.
230. Id. at 5.
231. Osiel, supra note 209, at 480 (quoting Judith Miller).

232. Emanuela Fronza, The Punishment of Negationism: The Difficult Dialogue Between Law
and Memory, 30 VT. L. REv. 609, 616-17 (2006).
233. TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, 1 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION REPORT

103-34 (1998) (S. Aft.), available at http:/lwww.justice.gov.za/trc/report/index.htm.
234. Olick, supra note 209, at 8.
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then this new version is the past, and no different past can ever have
at the moment,
235
existed.

Far worse than merely disseminating false claims about the
past, some governments, in an effort to distort or uproot shared
memory, have ordered mass killings, followed by attempted erasure of
any evidence of the slaughter. Stalin liquidated the Kulaks, the
agrarian middle class the Czar created in 1905 to be loyal to him, in
1929.236 The Nazis conceived "Operation Black Hole" in an effort to
eliminate any witness who might later testify to the horrors of the
death camps: "no witness was to survive, no document was to remain,
and all traces of the 'ovens' were to be eradicated so that no material
sign would remain to attest to the evil. '237 In this way, the Nazis tried
to complete the annihilation of their victims. As Jean Baudrillard
famously wrote, "forgetting the extermination is part of the
238
extermination itself.
There is, however, a counterpoint to officially coerced forgetting
that reveals another salutary function of memory in political life. That
is, the role of the moral witness. The moral witness secures, preserves,
and proclaims the first-person memory of injustice over and against
efforts by the powerful to snuff it out. 239 As Margalit noted, Primo Levi
believes the moral witness plays an indispensible part in exposing evil
and holding malefactors to account: "the most solid materials for
240
uncovering the facts of the crime are the memories of the survivors.

235. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 175-76 (Signet Classics 1950) (1949) quoted in Brian F.
Havel, In Search of a Theory of Public Memory: The State, the Individual, and Marcel Proust,80
IND. L.J. 605, 608 (2005). Havel goes on to discuss some of the techniques by which "official
memory" is manipulated, including "selectivity, constructivism, mythopoesis (mythmaking),
incorporation, and presentism." Id. at 612. Michel Foucault likewise observed the deep
connection between controlling memory and retaining political control: "[Miemory is ... a very
important factor in struggle . . . . [11f one controls people's memory, one controls their
It's vital to have possession of this memory, to control it, administer it, tell it
dynamism ....
what it must contain." Film and Popular Memory: An Interview with Michel Foucault, 11
RADICAL PHIL. 24, 25 (1975) quoted in Osiel, supranote 209, at 624.
236. MARGALIT, supra note 193, at 70-71.
237. Id. at 165.
238. MINOW, supra note 222, at 16 (citing JAMES E. YOUNG, THE TEXTURE OF MEMORY:
HOLOCAUST MEMORIALS AND MEANING 1 (1993)). Milan Kundera likewise captured the role that
forced forgetting can play in political oppression: "The struggle of man against power is the
struggle of memory against forgetting." MILAN KUNDERA, THE BOOK OF LAUGHTER AND
FORGETTING 3 (Michael H. Heim trans., 1980), quoted in Osiel, supra note 209, at 464.
239. MARGALIT, supra note 193, at 147 ("Collective memory has agents and agencies
entrusted with preserving and diffusing it."). Margalit goes on to reflect on the nature and
characteristics of the moral witness. Id. at 148-82.
240. MARGALIT, supra note 193, at 166.
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But the role of the moral witness is not merely to give a cold,
rote account of atrocities observed. Having experienced the atrocities
recounted firsthand, he is in a position to infuse his story with an
241
authentic emotional content that is fitting to the horrors witnessed.
The moral witness is able to "tell[ ] it like it felt."242 This affective
dimension serves at least two important purposes. First, it illustrates
the injustice in a way that resonates humanly with those who hear the
account. 243 Margalit borrows from Wittgenstein's discussion of human
sacrifice to illustrate the point:
In trying to understand a ritual of human sacrifice, it is not the historical account of
how the ritual evolved that yields understanding but rather our grasp of the deep and
sinister impression that the ritual makes on us. This kind of understanding is not
gained by a mechanical enumeration of the dead or the badly injured but by an
elucidatory description of what took place
so that we can link the experience of the
2 44
victims with our own meager experience.

Thus, the moral witness is able to convey more vividly the evils
suffered, in a language that connects to the listener in a deeper, more
human way. The enormity of the injustice is understood viscerally as
well as intellectually. Empathy for the moral witness is stronger.
Moreover, the richer, full textured first-person account also allows us
to recognize ourselves in the perpetratorsof atrocity-it allows us, in
Gilbert Meilaender's words, to "remember "the evil of which we
ourselves are capable. '245 Accordingly, this richer understanding of the
suffering and injustice serves as a more powerful incentive to remain
vigilant against similarly evil future acts.
A second value to the affective content of the richer, firstperson account of the moral witness is that its particularity allows us
to honor the victims as individuals. It gives faces and names to those
harmed. Martha Minow has powerfully underscored the dangers of
generalized memory in this domain:
[A]s Judith Miller writes, "Abstraction is memory's most ardent enemy." It encourages
distance and often, indifference. Etty Hillesum, who died in Auschwitz, wrote in her
diary: "[tihe outside world probably thinks of us as a grey, uniform suffering mass of

Jews, and knows nothing of the gulfs and abysses and subtle differences that exist

241. For this reason, Margalit notes it is crucial for the moral witness to have "congruence
between his emotions and his avowals." Id. at 170.
242. Id. at 168.
243. Id. at 169 ("Mhis deep and sinister aspect is not obvious just from learning the history
of the external action, but 'we impute it from an experience in ourselves.' " (quoting LUDWIG
WrITGENSTEIN, REMARKs ON FRAZER's GOLDEN BOUGH 16 (1967))).

244. Id. (generalizing Wittgenstein's interpretations on symbolic behavior to the context of
the moral witness).
245. Meilaender, supra note 169, at 22.
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between us." She anticipated our problem even to this day: how to remember her and all
246
the others as distinctive individuals.

Mass atrocities sever individuals (who, of course, comprise distinctive
groups) from the circle of human care and concern. Restoration
requires "re-membering" the victims as irreplaceable, particular
individuals who are the bearers of human rights and human
dignity. 247 The testimony of the moral witness is crucial to this
process.
D. Brief Reflection on Memory, Emotion, and Morality
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that memory is
integral to life as humanly lived, both on an individual and collective
level. Before proceeding further, it is worth underscoring two
interrelated insights that have likewise emerged from the previous
discussion, both of which are highly relevant to the question of
memory and punishment. First, memory is inextricably intertwined
with moral judgment and action. 248 Second, the affective content of
memory-the emotional dimension of memory-largely determines a
memory's character, effect, and function.
As noted above, memory makes moral reflection and
decisionmaking possible. Memory is the mechanism by which moral
responsibilities are transmitted, learned, retained, and recalled. By
integrating an individual's past, present, and future, memory enables
us to honor our moral obligations, as well as to hold others to account.
Conversely, by sustaining personal identity, memory makes it possible
for others to fully hold us to account for our moral obligations. We
have a moral obligation to remember our promises and responsibilities
to others. Memory undergirds altruism-acting in the interests of
others, perhaps contrary to present inclinations and desires. Memory
makes empathy possible, which is the basis of granting, seeking, and
accepting forgiveness, and is a key to reconciliation. Memory is
necessary for gratitude, honor, and loyalty. Memory is the foundation
and sine qua non of moral witness. We have an obligation to
remember and bear witness to instances of radical evil and injustice.
We have an obligation to fittingly remember the victims of such acts.
246. Martha Minow, The Work of Re-Membering: After Genocide and Mass Atrocity, 23
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 429, 432 (1999) (citations omitted).
247. See id. Minow also uses the term "re-membering" to denote the reconstruction of the
community following mass atrocity, including victims and oppressors alike. Id. at 430.
248. Unlike Margalit, this Article does not engage the question of a distinction between
"morality" versus "ethics"-it uses the terms interchangeably.
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Memory allows us to rectify past wrongs and restore others to
membership in the human community. As Ross Poole has written,
memory "remains an inescapable part of the process through which we
claim or accept the burdens and responsibilities, rights and privileges,
of any complex form of human existence. As such, it is an essential
'2 49
part of the moral life.
Emotion is crucial to memory. As noted above, modern science
has confirmed that memories accompanied by emotional stress (and
the attendant proliferation of certain neurotransmitters such as
norepinephrine) are clearer and more durable than those that are
not.250 Mysteriously, in still other cases, a surfeit of stress and emotion
can cause amnesia. 251 The adaptive value of this process is obvious. So
too are the problems associated with a superabundance of stress in
memory that can lead to burdensome persistent memories of painful
experiences (for example, PTSD). Ren6 Descartes noted the adaptive
value of affective memory in the seventeenth century:
[T]he utility of all the passions consists only in their strengthening thoughts which it is
good that the soul preserve and which could otherwise easily be effaced from it, and
causing them to endure in the soul. So too all the evil they can cause consists either in
their strengthening and preserving those thoughts more than necessary or in their
2 52
strengthening and preserving others it is not good to dwell upon.

Emotion amplifies the force of memory and catalyzes action. Marcel
Proust's A la Recherche du Temps Perdu captures this power of
emotion for memory, which has been described as "transcendent...
since it overcomes the distance that normally separates recall of past
'253
events from the lived experience of those events.
The relationship between memory and morality turns largely
on how and to what extent such memories are animated by emotion.
As Margalit has observed, "the emotions engage us with objects in a
way that makes the objects lose their neutrality for us and become
'marked': fearful, loveable, disgusting, exciting and so on. '254 Thus, the
meaning of a memory and its impact on future actions depend on the
emotions that attend it. Ideally, indignation and empathy should
accompany memories of injustice and of the unjustly treated victims;
regret and shame should accompany memories of wrongs committed
against others; gratitude should accompany memories of receiving
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

See Poole, supra note 165, at 156.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
DESCARTES, supra note 7, at 59.
Havel, supra note 235, at 611.
MARGALIT, supranote 193, at 129.
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forgiveness and compassion. When rightly ordered, and modulated at
the right pitch, the emotions that infuse a memory can suggest the
fitting response to a moral judgment: to come to the aid of those
suffering, to defend the vulnerable, to stop wrongdoers and hold them
to account, consistent with the demands of justice and mercy.
However, when the attending emotions are wrongly ordered,
asymmetrical, or disproportionately strong or weak in regard to
memories of an injustice or moral wrong done, the results produced
can be devastating. A flat emotional response to memory of atrocity
can produce indifference, muting the desire to aid survivors and
pursue corrective justice. Such indifference inhibits vigilance in
preventing future atrocities. By contrast, a disproportionately strong
and persistent emotional response to memory of humiliation can fan
the flames of revenge or produce debilitating trauma. While it is
certainly beyond the scope of this Article to offer a calculus for finding
the proper relationship between emotions and memory, it is clear that
such a balance must be found. As Martha Minow has rightly observed,
memory is "double-edged ...[it] fuels cycles of hatred but it is also
essential to personal integrity and for bearing witness to injustice." 255
IV.MEMORY MODIFICATION AND PUNISHMENT

Before exploring the challenges that neurobiological techniques
for memory modification hold for criminal punishment, it is necessary
to reprise the caveat stated at the outset that none of these techniques
are on the immediate horizon. Developmentally, they are at various
stages of infancy. Moreover, their prospective applications are first
and foremost aimed at patients suffering from diseases and other
pathological conditions that concern memory (for example,
Alzheimer's disease and PTSD). This Article is not arguing that the
era of widespread memory modification is upon us. Rather, it is taking
the speculative and projected application of memory modification
techniques for healthy individuals as an opportunity to reflect on the
heretofore underexplored relationship between memory and
punishment. That said, it is a useful exercise to consider the
consequences for criminal punishment if such memory modification
techniques ever actually come into routine use among the healthy.
The present demonstrates how this might occur in the future, given
the widespread demand for such drugs and the current proliferation of
off-label prescription (and illegal distribution) of other kinds of
255. MINOW, supranote 221, at 4.
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psychopharmaceuticals (for example, Ritalin) by a large and growing
population of individuals who may not meet the diagnostic criteria for
2 56
the diseases for which those drugs were intended.
A. Brief Reflection on Law and Memory
Obviously, memory plays a crucial role in the administration of
law generally-especially in the courtroom. Accurate factfinding, a
central aspiration of both the civil and criminal trial, depends in
crucial ways upon memory, as recorded in documents or other
material evidence, or in the minds of witnesses. More deeply, the law
itself is a product and reflection of memory. As the above quote from
Holmes reflects, law is the embodiment of a polity's evolution. Like the
human genome, it includes the conserved remnants of prior moments
in a long train of developmental stages culminating in the organism's
current state. This is particularly true of the common law. The law
(positive and decisional) reflects the judgments that the polity have
come to regarding important goods to be pursued and harms to be
avoided, as well as the means calculated to attain such ends.
The law is not, however, merely a product and reflection of
memory. It also shapes and sustains memory in important ways, both
in the substance of its doctrine and in its implementation. Contract
law aims to ensure that promises are remembered. Tort law facilitates
remembrance of the duties of care owed by all members of the polity to
one another. Property law sustains memory of ownership and its
transfer. Constitutional law sustains memory of the government's
structural design as well as the nation's foundational principles and
commitments. Criminal law amplifies the memory of the most serious
boundaries of behavior that must be respected by all. And so on. Law,
like memory, is "a locus of present responsibility" and "sets the moral
257
agenda" for the future.

256. See supra note 153.
257. Poole, supra note 165, at 156.
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B. Punishment and the Importance of Remembering
Fitly and Truly
Of all the topics that constitute social (and political and legal)
philosophy, punishment-its rationale, nature, methods,
purposes, and occasions-looms large if not largest.
258
- Hugo Adam Bedau
The human context of criminal punishment is profound. It
implicates thick concepts of moral agency (and free will),
responsibility, the authority (and legitimacy) of state action,
individual rights and liberties, the obligations of citizenship,
solidarity, empathy, mercy, and justice (in its manifold forms). It is
also inextricably intertwined with memory, individual and collective.
This Section unpacks the relationship between punishment and
memory. More specifically, it examines how memory animates the
various (and, in some cases, competing) distributive theories of
punishment. 259 And, by extension, it explores the unique theoretical
challenges novel neurobiological techniques of memory modification
raise. For clarity of focus, the analysis is mostly limited to the capital
sentencing process.
These questions of "whom" to punish and "how much"
punishment is warranted are deeply intertwined with memory, from a
variety of angles, across contexts, including the traditional
distributive justifications for punishment such as just deserts (or
retributive justice), deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.
This is also true of the relatively more novel distributive justifications
such as the education of the polity and the restoration and repair of
the relationship between offender and victim, as well as among these
individuals and the broader community. Because memory is integral
to these justifications, the possibility of neurobiological memory
modification (for any of the individuals or groups touched by the

258. Hugo Adam Bedau, Feinberg'sLiberal Theory of Punishment, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 103,

104 (2001).
259. H.L.A. Hart distinguished the "General Justifying Aim" of punishment from its
distributive justifications. The former constitutes the ultimate legitimating goal of punishment,
whereas the latter is a limiting or qualifying principle that informs the scope of liability (namely,
who should or should not be punished) and the amount of punishment that may be meted out
(i.e., how much or little to punish the convicted offender). See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 8-13 (1968) (applying distinction to

retributive justice and concluding that one need not hold retribution as sole justifying aim of
punishment in order to accept its limitations on scope and severity of such punishment); 0.
Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the "Complexity" of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1265, 1333 (2007) (discussing same with reference to Hart).
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process and execution of punishment) poses unique challenges and
potential disruptions.
This analysis of memory, memory modification, and
punishment takes as its point of departure a concept introduced by the
President's Council on Bioethics in its 2003 report, Beyond Therapy:
Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness. In its discussion of
memory modification, the Council suggested that remembering one's
260
experiences "fitly and truly" is essential to leading an ethical life.
Remembering an experience "truly" requires forming and preserving
an accurate memory-one that comports with the facts as they
occurred. Remembering "fitly" requires that the memory be infused
with an appropriate affective content, in light of the memory's
substance. That is, the memory should be animated by a morally
appropriate sentiment (for example, admiration or indignation, pride
or shame) and modulated proportionately (neither too strong or
persistent, nor too weak or transient).
This Section will argue that remembering fitly and truly is
likewise essential to vindicating the manifold distributive principles of
punishment noted above. The substantive and affective content of the
memory-of the convicted defendant, the judge and jury, the victim,
and the broader society-are integral to just and effective punishment.
Memory modification, should it become reliable and widespread, thus
represents a challenge in this regard (as discussed in the sections to
follow).
1. Remembering Fitly and Truly Is Essential to
Retributive Justice
Memory looms large for retributive justice. Retributive
justice-also called punishment according to desert or "just
deserts" 261-is the oldest principle of punishment. 262 It is a distributive
260. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 4, at 226-33. The Council touched
very briefly on the question of memory dampening and criminal justice, noting that both
criminals and totalitarian societies have acute interests that their crimes be forgotten (both by
their victims, the broader society, and even by themselves).
261. This Article will use these phrases interchangeably. Recently, Paul Robinson has
offered a typology of desert. See infra note 264.
262. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRiMINAL LAW § 1.5 (2d ed. 2003). Retributive justice
has been much criticized by the legal commentariat as a source of brutality and inhumanity. See,
e.g., Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud:A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of Death Row
and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 410-13 (2005)
("Countless cases in the Supreme Court equate retributivism with revenge or the desire to make
criminals suffer or both. . . . MVarious commentators reflexively embrace this view . . .");

Edward Rubin, Just Say No to Retribution, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 17, 49-55 (2003); Mitchell N.
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theory263 that allocates punishment "according to the offender's
personal blameworthiness for the past offense, which takes account
not only of the seriousness of the offense, but also the full range of
culpability, capacity, and situational factors that we understand to
affect an offender's blameworthiness." 264 The emphasis on the
offender's culpability is the key distinguishing feature of retributive
justice.
This principal animating emphasis on culpability has concrete
entailments for who may be punished, and how much punishment is
just. First and foremost, retributive justice requires that only the
guilty be punished. As Gerard V. Bradley has noted, "[t]he most
important moral signature of retribution is its exceptionless protection
of the innocent from conviction." 265 Even for those duly convicted,
retributive justice imposes important constraints on the amount of
punishment rendered. Indeed, there are many instances in which
retributive justice offers far more robust protections to the criminally
convicted than the competing distributive theories of punishment
(especially deterrence and incapacitation). As Albert Alschuler has
observed:
Sometimes, however, withholding punishment does not undercut the social contract or
the general sense of reciprocity and mutual obligation. The wrongdoer may not seem to
be a free rider; he may appear to be more sinned against than sinning; he may have had
no real choice; he may have been subjected to extraordinary temptations; he may have
been too immature to be responsible; he may have suffered enough; we may accept his
apology and expression of remorse as sincere. Retributivism takes these circumstances
into account without strain or rationalization. The other textbook purposes of

Berman, Punishment and Justification 2-3 & n.5 (Univ. of Tex., Pub. Law Research Paper No.
129, 2006), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract-956610 ('Retributivists are said to be unable to
make clear either why wrongdoers deserve to suffer or why it is permissible for a state
institution to inflict suffering even if deserved. They are also deplored as savage or barbaric.").
For reasons discussed below, this is an incomplete account of the doctrine and its effects.
263. John Finnis and Gerard V. Bradley have defended retributive justice also as the firstorder justification for punishment-not merely a distributive principle. See John Finnis,
Retribution: Punishment's Formative Aim, 44 AM. J. JURIS. 91, 102 (1999); Gerard V. Bradley,
Retribution and the Secondary Aims of Punishment, 44 AM. J. JuRIs. 105 (1999). For additional
accounts of retributive justice as a general justifying aim, see Rebecca Dresser, PersonalIdentity
and Punishment, 70 B.U. L. REV. 395, 420-21 (1990) (describing alternative approaches).
264. Paul H. Robinson, The A.L.I.'s Proposed Distributive Principle of 'Limiting
Retributivism" Does It Mean Anything in Practice Other Than Pure Desert?, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 3, 5 (2003). Robinson offers a comprehensive typology of "desert" in Competing Conceptions
of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145 (2008)
(distinguishing "vengeful desert" which exacts the same measure of suffering from the defendant
as that which he caused the victim, from "deontological desert," which judges blameworthiness
according to abstract notions of good and evil, and "empirical desert," which focuses on
blameworthiness as defined by shared intuitions of justice in the relevant community).
265. Bradley, supranote 263, at 109.
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precisely because it
punishment do not ....The formula "an eye for an eye" is horrifying
266
does not adequately take account of an offender's culpability.

Retributive justice has been the lynchpin of the Supreme
Court's "narrowing jurisprudence" 267 for the death penalty, which
limits death eligibility to "a narrow category of the most serious
crimes" and defendants "whose extreme culpability makes them 'the
most deserving of execution.' ",268 Precisely because of its commitment
to retributive justice, the Supreme Court has barred the execution of
mentally retarded defendants, 269 defendants who were under the age
of eighteen when their offense was committed, 270 defendants convicted
of felony murder who did not actually kill or attempt to kill the
victim, 271 defendants convicted of raping an adult woman, 272 and child

rapists. 273
Retributive justice's requirement that punishment be tailored
to culpability can be seen in the structure of the capital sentencing
process, most obviously in the jury's consideration of aggravating and
mitigating factors. While specifics vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, nearly all capital sentencing regimes require the jury to
consider mitigating 274 and aggravating 275 factors in assessing whether
266. Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective
on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (2003).
Alschuler also notes that a commitment to retributive justice does not foreclose acceptance of
consequentialist benefits that flow from adoption of this punishment theory. See id. at 15
(clarifying that retributivists "need not deny the legitimacy of other goals of punishment').
267. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002). For a discussion of the Court's discussion of
retributive justice, see Dan Markel, Executing Retributivism: Panetti and the Future of the
Eighth Amendment, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1163, 1180-81 (2009) (discussing Kennedy v. Louisiana,
128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008), Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007), and Atkins, 536 U.S. 304,
among other cases).
268. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319).
269. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
270. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
271. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
272. Coker v. Georgia, 43 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
273. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 442 (2008) (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319;
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)) ("The goal of retribution,
which reflects society's and the victim's interests in seeing that the offender is repaid for the hurt
he caused.., does not justify the harshness of the death penalty here.").
274. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4626 (2007 & Supp. 2010) (repealed 2010) (listing
several common statutory mitigating factors, such as lack of prior criminal history, minor or
accomplice role in crime commuted by another, "the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbances," and when defendant's capacity "to appreciate the criminality of [his] conduct or to
conform [his] conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired).
275. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 592-93 & n.1 (2002) (listing statutory
aggravating factors, including prior conviction for a "serious offense," commission of offense for
"anything of pecuniary value," and commission of offense "in an especially heinous, cruel or
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the convicted defendant deserves the death penalty.27 6 The Supreme
Court has held that that defendants are entitled to present mitigating
evidence related to "any aspect of [the] defendant's character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers
277
as a basis for a sentence less than death."
Those defendants reaching the sentencing phase of the capital
trial have already satisfied the prerequisite legal thresholds for
sanity, competence, and the capacity to formulate the relevant mens
rea. At this stage of the criminal process, therefore, "it is impossible to
offer an 'excuse' for the defendant's acts. The jury already knows that
no justifiable excuse exists for what the defendant did."278 Mitigation
evidence is thus not intended to excuse from guilt. Rather it is
submitted to "inspire[ ] compassion ...offer[ing] neither justification,
nor excuse for the capital crime." 279 A mitigation claim is an appeal to
the jurors' sense of empathy, seeking leniency on the grounds that
some aspect of the defendant's character, background, or life
experiences diminish his culpability such that he deserves a
punishment less than death. Mitigation claims are thus rooted
squarely in the principle of retributive justice: "Underlying [the
Supreme Court precedents bearing on the doctrine of mitigation] is
the principle that punishment should be directly related to the
28 0
personal culpability of the criminal defendant."

depraved manner") (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G) (2001)); Jonathan Simon &
Christina Spaulding, Tokens of Our Esteem: Aggravating Factorsin the Era of Deregulated Death
Penalties, in THE KILLING STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 81, 91
tbl.4.2 (Austin Sarat ed., 1999) (listing aggravating factors in various states).
276. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 172-74 (2006) (noting that states may weigh
aggravating and mitigating factors as they please, provided they observe fundamental principles
of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that all capital sentencing schemes
must "(1) rationally narrow the class of death-eligible defendants; and (2) permit a jury to render
a reasoned, individualized sentencing determination based on a death-eligible defendant's
record, personal characteristics, and the circumstances of his crime"). For a discussion of
different approaches to comparing aggravating and mitigating factors, see James R. Acker &
Charles S. Lanier, Matters of Life or Death: The Sentencing Provisions in Capital Punishment
Statutes, 31 CRIM. L. BULL. 19, 33-52 (1995).
277. See Marsh, 548 U.S. at 174 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)).
278. Peter T. Hansen, Mitigation: An Outline of Law, Method and Strategy, CAP. DEF. DIG.,
Apr. 1992, at 29, 32.
279. John M. Fabian, Death Penalty Mitigation and the Role of the Forensic Psychologist, 27
LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 73, 78 (2003 (quoting Russell Stetler, Mental Disabilitiesand Mitigation,
23 CHAMPION 49, 50 (1999)).
280. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538,
545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)), overruled in part by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 31619 (2002).
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Fairly appraising the mitigating and aggravating factors
relevant to a defendant's culpability involves not merely cold, rational
analysis of the jurors. It is a calculus that includes emotional faculties
as well-ranging from the capacity for righteous indignation, on the
one hand, to the ability to empathize, on the other. For example, when
considering aggravating factors, jurors are often asked to make
judgments about the degree of moral depravity or brutality reflected
by the crime. Consider, in this regard, some of the common statutory
aggravating factors in this vein: "Desecration or Mutilation of Victim's
Body, Sexual Abuse or Exploitation of a Child, Victim was a Child,
Victim was Elderly or Disabled, Victim was a Family Member, and
Victim was Pregnant." 28 1 Also, multiple jurisdictions include as an
aggravating factor whether a murder was "especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity."28 2 It would
seem that an intact and well-ordered moral sensibility is necessary for
283
the just assessment of this type of evidence.
Similarly, a well-ordered sense of empathy is necessary to
fairly appraise mitigating evidence. That is, to give fitting weight to
mitigating evidence requires the capacity, in the words of Martha
Nussbaum, to "see the other as a center of perception, emotion, and
reason, rather than an inert object." 2 8 The juror in this instance is
called upon to discern whether taking into account the "diverse
frailties of humankind" 28 5 manifest in this particular defendant, a
proportionate response is a sentence less than death. This process
invariably requires the exercise of moral sentiment and placing
oneself in the position of the other to be judged. It requires reflection
on the character, background, extenuating circumstances, and
remorse of the defendant. Conversely, the feeling and expression of
remorse by the defendant-part and parcel of an authentic and

281. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Casting a Wider Net: Another Decade of Legislative Expansion of
the Death Penalty in the United States, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 18-25 (2006).
282. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (2008). For similar formulations, see, e.g., ALA. CODE §13A-549 (LexisNexis 2005); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-604 (2006);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53A-46A (West 2007); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 2006); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-657 (LexisNexis 2007); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 19-2515 (2004); KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-4625 (West 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. §

99-19-101 (2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1 (West 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (2009).
283. Obviously, fleshing out the contours of such a well-ordered moral sensibility is a deeply
complicated question, well beyond the scope of this Article.
284. MARTHA
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effective mitigation claim-requires moral sensitivity and empathy for
the victim.
In short, retributive justice requires that the punishment track
culpability in a proportionate measure. Measuring culpability turns on
clear-eyed assessment of the harms wrought as well as the defendant's
character and state of mind, taken as whole. All of these appraisals
require the capacity for indignation and empathy.
So, how does remembering fitly and truly bear on harmonizing
punishment and culpability? More specifically, how might
neurobiological memory modification frustrate this aspiration? To
illustrate the potential challenges in this context, it is useful to
consider several hypothetical cases.
Case 1: Unmediated Memory
In the first case, consider a defendant who robs a convenience
store. After taking the contents of the cash register, he impetuously
kills the clerk, in an effort to eliminate eye witnesses to the crime. He
is apprehended and convicted of capital murder. During the
sentencing phase of the capital trial, the defendant reflects on his
background: his broken childhood, marked by unspeakable abuse and
neglect; years of drug and alcohol use; a spotty and unstable
employment history; and a history of using violence to impose his will
and pursue his interests. Based on this reflection, he is able, with the
aid of his lawyer, to construct a mitigation case rooted in this
narrative. In addition to reflecting on his own past, the defendant
considers the effect that his actions have had on the victim, his family,
and the community in which the crime occurred. With the aid of a
therapist, he is finally able to see himself in the people whose lives he
violated and destroyed. He comes to deeply regret his misdeed and
expresses his remorse to the jury.
For their part, the jurors appraise both the aggravating and
mitigating evidence. They remember and reflect on the facts as
presented several weeks before during the guilt phase of the trial: the
barbaric nature of the crime, the helplessness of the victim, and the
atrocious indifference of the defendant to human life. They reflect on
their own attachments, loved ones, and communities (past and
present), and feel fitting moral indignation. But they also consider the
circumstances of the defendant's background and experiences. Some of
them consider their own life's narrative (including past mistakes and
regrets), and try to imagine what they would do if subjected to the
deprivations and abuse that characterize the defendant's personal
history. They reflect on his remorse, and they judge it to be genuine.
They feel appropriate empathy and sympathy for the defendant.
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Case 2: Memory Erasure in the Defendant
Consider the same scenario described above, but imagine that,
prior to committing the robbery, the defendant takes a dose of
Rohypnol to induce anterograde amnesia-effectively wiping out any
memories of the crime itself. He is apprehended, found competent
(despite his amnesia, he is able to understand the nature and object of
the proceedings and assist in his own defense), 28 6 and is convicted of
capital murder.
Alternatively, imagine the same defendant commits the crime
without the influence of drugs and is arrested and charged. But
during the pendency of his case, undergoes extensive electroconvulsive
therapy (ECT) to treat intractable depression. As a result, his memory
of the crime and much of his past is erased.
In both instances, when trying to construct a mitigation case,
the defendant finds it difficult to reflect on the details of the crime to
generate a sense of empathy in himself for the victim, and, by
extension, remorse. In the alternative ECT scenario, he is unable to
fully access his past in a way to articulate the narrative of
extraordinary deprivation and hardship that contributed to his
disastrous conduct.
Case 3: Memory Dampening in the Defendant
In this case, imagine that the defendant takes an adequate
dose of propranolol in advance of his crime to prevent the shameful
and painful memories of the horrific acts he then commits.
Alternatively, in the weeks following the crime, he pursues a strategy
of reconsolidation blockade with propranolol, dampening the pain and
shame of the memories after the fact.
During the sentencing phase of the trial he can only remember
the murder as a neutral event. The memory is not infused with any
meaningful or appropriate affective content. He is not able to feel
authentic empathy or regret. Thus, his mitigation claim lacks a truly
felt element of regret.

286. See 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 207 (1984) (describing the
jurisprudence of amnesia, and explaining that amnesia, standing alone, is rarely sufficient to
support a claim of incompetence or that the trial is rendered fundamentally unfair); see also
Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Amnesia as Affecting Capacity to Commit Crime or Stand
Trial, 46 A.L.R.3d 544, § 2(a) (1972) (noting that generally amnesia per se is not a defense unless
the accused did not know the nature of the act and that the act was wrong); James E. Tyesse &
Thomas L. Hafemeister, Amnesia and the Determination of Competency to Stand Trial, 25 DEV.
MENTAL HEALTH L. 65, 65-66 (2006) (noting that American courts have been unanimous in
refusing to equate amnesia with incompetency).
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Case 4: Memory Enhancement in the Defendant
Imagine that the defendant, just before the crime, takes a drug
sufficient to amplify the stress and emotion that attend the encoded
memory. Or, imagine that it is possible to amplify the emotional
content of the memory after the fact by reconsolidation accompanied
by an injection of a suitable excitatory agent. His memory of the crime
itself may very well be more clear and durable. Additionally, the drugs
effectively up-regulate the emotional content of the memories. He is
plagued by the emotional pain of the memories-constantly reliving
the events with all of their stress, fear, and emotion. He is tortured by
the memories and racked with guilt. He experiences profound
remorse. This is all conveyed to the jurors in his mitigation case.
Case 5: Memory Dampening of Jurors
Turning from the defendant to the jurors, imagine one or more
jurors take propranolol in anticipation of seeing and hearing horrific
evidence of the murder. Sufficient time passes between the
presentation of the evidence and the jury's sentencing deliberations
such that the facts of the crime are remembered as neutral. Those
jurors under the influence of propranolol are unable to access the
fitting emotions of revulsion and indignation that the murder
narrative would normally provoke.
Consider the possibility that some jurors took propranolol in
anticipation of hearing the horrific account of the defendant's past,
presented as part of his mitigation claim. Over time, the defendant's
narrative of deprivation of abuse would be recalled as emotionally
neutral by such jurors. The defendant's story would perhaps not
inspire in the jurors a substantial empathetic reaction.
Imagine alternatively that there are several jurors who have
been taking propranolol on a regular basis to dull the sting of painful
and shameful memories of their own past conduct. As a result, when
they hear the facts put forth by the defendant in his mitigation claim,
the narrative of hardship, terrible choices, and disastrous behavior
does not resonate with them. They are not reminded by analogy of the
pain and shame of their own failings and missteps.
Case 6. Memory Enhancement of Jurors
Imagine, finally, that certain jurors decide to take
psychopharmacological agents that will enhance the memory and/or
the stress and pain of the memories encoded when they hear the
details of the defendant's crime. They take such drugs to preserve
their memory of the crime itself in a measure beyond the normal
capacities of the average person. Perhaps they also do not want to dull
the sting of the horror of the crime itself. To the contrary, they want to
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"burn it into their minds" in order to do justice to the victim's
suffering. As a result, these jurors experience a powerful, persistent
sense of moral indignation and revulsion for the crime, and by
extension, for the defendant. The human costs of the crime are
foremost in their consideration when weighing both aggravating and
mitigating factors. Their visceral disgust for the crime itself crowds
out other thoughts, including those relating to the background,
character, and experiences of the defendant set forth in his mitigation
claim.
Alternatively, such memory enhancement of the details of the
mitigation claim by the jurors could prompt a similarly asymmetrical
response to the defendant's history of deprivation and abuse, in
contrast with the horror of crime itself. That is, artificially amplifying
the memory of the mitigating evidence while leaving the memory of
the details of the crime itself unenhanced could lead jurors to pay
undue emphasis to the former at the expense of the latter.
What Do the Cases Show?
Obviously, the above cases are fanciful. But the fanciful
exaggerations are intended to underscore an abiding truth, namely,
that there is a connection between retributive justice and memory.
Moreover, disrupting the latter can lead to serious complications for
the project of modulating punishment according to culpability: the
chief animating goal of retributive justice. Why is this so? There are
several reasons.
Take first the question of who may be punished consistent with
just deserts. Recall that this distributive principle forbids punishment
of those individuals who have done no wrong. Case 1 poses no such
problem. Case 2, involving memory erasure (particularly involving
retrograde amnesia caused by ECT) raises a nontrivial question of
personal identity that must be addressed. Rebecca Dresser, in
discussing the work of Derek Parfit on punishment and identity, has
noted that:
[D]esert claims can only be sustained if a person is an entity who is ...stable over time.
For punishment to be fair, the person punished must be the same person who previously
disobeyed the law. If not, an innocent person unjustly pays the price
for another's
287
wrongdoing, an outcome which retributivists universally denounce.

Similarly, Joel Feinberg has agreed that "all of our ordinary notions of
responsibility... presuppose a continuity of personal identity between
earlier and later stages" of the same individual's life. 2 88 John Locke
287. Dresser, supranote 2, at 421-22 (internal citations omitted).
288. Id. (quoting JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 83-84 (1986)).
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likewise raised the concern about punishing the amnesiac. 289 The
retrograde amnesia caused by the ECT raises a question about the
psychological continuity between the defendant before and after his
forgetting. The amnesia induced by Rohypnol raises similar questions,
though thornier, since the defendant intentionally induced the
forgetting. It is unlikely that the psychological discontinuity forced by
the amnesia in either case would be sufficient to raise a serious
question of personal identity. As noted above, the modern
jurisprudence of amnesia is skeptical of such claims. But,
nevertheless, "to justify retributive desert, it is necessary to determine
whether there is a morally relevant psychological connection between
an offender and a person subject to punishment. 290 True memory is a
key constituent of this psychological connection. At the very least, the
memory erasure in Case 2 interferes with the defendant's true recall
of his own past, which is integral to constructing a mitigation
narrative grounded in the truth. Accordingly, the jury will be inhibited
in acquiring facts crucial to harmonizing punishment with desert.
The greater challenge memory modification poses for
retributive justice, as illustrated by the above cases, arises with the
up- or down-regulation of affective content in memory. In Case 3, it is
clear that the down-regulation of the affective content of the
defendant's memory prevents a fitting memory of his own crime.
Without such a fitting memory, the defendant is unable to grasp fully
the horror of his own acts. This poses an obstacle to empathy, and
thus remorse. This complicates the task of punishing in a way that
tracks culpability. Does it matter that the failure to encode the
emotional valence of the crime was intentional? Would it matter if it
were not? Should the jury punish the defendant as they would a
sociopath, who cares nothing for the harms on others he inflicts? Or
should they be more lenient, depending on how they judge his motives
in taking the drug?
What do just deserts require for the defendant in Case 4 who
has up-regulated his memory of his crime? Should the jury consider
289. See id. at 428 (quoting John Locke, Of Identity and Diversity, in 1 AN ESSAY
CONCERNING HuMAN UNDERSTANDING 439, 464 (A. Fraser ed., 1959) (1690)). Some arguments
for clemency or pardons likewise rest on a different claim of personal discontinuity, namely, that
the convict in question has been rehabilitated and is no longer the person who committed the
original crime. High profile cases involving these arguments include the matters of Stanley
"Tookie" Williams and Karla Fay Tucker. See, e.g., Evan J. Mandery, Commentary: Mercy and
Contrition, 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 339 (2006) (discussing Williams' case); Mary Sigler, Mercy,
Clemency, and the Case of Karla Fay Tucker, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 455, 456 (2007) (discussing
Tucker's case).
290. Dresser, supra note 2, at 427.
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his amplified remorse and self-torment in appraising what he
deserves? Again, does it matter that his remorse is, by design,
chemically induced (exogenously)? At the very least, finding a
punishment that fits culpability is complicated by memory
modification in this case.
What about the jurors in Case 5? Down-regulating their
emotions to prevent the encoding the memory of the crimes as
described in court may mute their capacity for indignation and
revulsion in the face of this particular human atrocity. Will this
failure to remember fitly impair their ability to take on board the
horror of the crime, and thus culpability of the defendant? The same
could be asked of those jurors who down-regulate their memories of
the defendant's life narrative (presented in mitigation). Might they be
compromised in their efforts to ascribe adequate weight to his history
of pain and suffering? If so, the project of fashioning a punishment
that suits the defendant's moral responsibility is likewise
compromised. And what about the jurors who are in the habit of downregulating the shameful or painful memories of their own misconduct?
Might this not impair their capacity for empathy, which is also
integral to discerning culpability in service of finding a fitting
punishment according to just deserts?
Finally, what about the jurors in Case 6 who have intentionally
amplified their memory of the defendant's crime (and perhaps its
affective content)? This is also a departure from remembering fitly.
These jurors have an artificially induced volume of indignation and
revulsion disproportionate to that associated with an unmodulated
memory. It would seem that the emotions that suffuse the jurors'
memory are likely to interfere with a fair appraisal of the facts and
circumstances that mitigate the defendant's culpability. This has
deleterious consequences for the project of harmonizing punishment
with responsibility, as required by just deserts. The same could be
said of those jurors who have artificially amplified their memories of
the defendant's troubled past. Weighing culpability in this instance
might be difficult (to the unfair benefit of the defendant), considering
the weaker memory of the crime itself.
In conclusion, as the cases above demonstrate, the central task
of retributive justice-harmonizing punishment and desert-depends
in crucial ways on remembering truly and fitly. Modifying memory
neurobiologically seriously complicates this goal by preventing access
to accurate accounts of the crime, or by preventing authentic emotions
(felt in the appropriate degree) integral to appraising culpability, such

20111

MEMORY AND PUNISHMENT

1257

as indignation (in response to29 1aggravating factors) or empathy (in
response to mitigating factors).
2. Remembering Fitly and Truly Is Essential to
Effective Deterrence
Albeit in less dramatic fashion, memory likewise plays a
significant role in the distributive justification for punishment
traditionally referred to as deterrence. The aims of deterrence are
twofold. First, under the doctrine of specific deterrence (also referred
to as "particular deterrence" or even "intimidation"), the purpose is "to
deter the criminal himself (rather than to deter others) from
committing further crimes, by giving him an unpleasant experience he
will not want to endure again."292 Second, for general deterrence
(sometimes called "general prevention"), punishing the criminal is
intended to deter others from committing similar crimes in the future,
so as to avoid the same negative consequences. 293 For both aspects of
deterrence, the chief aim is to reduce the overall incidence of crime.
This is accomplished by appealing to the rational self-interest of the
relevant actors-the defendant (in the case of specific deterrence) and
the broader society (in the case of general deterrence). The distributive
considerations of whom and how much to punish, are thus calibrated
to effectuate this consequentialist goal. 294 For both types of deterrence
291. There remain a few related issues beyond the scope of the current inquiry but
nevertheless are worth flagging for future consideration. First, might a serious disruption in
memory wrought by neurobiological interventions foreclose the execution of a convicted
defendant on the grounds that he is not able to "comprehend[ ] the meaning and purpose of the
punishment" as discussed in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 960 (2007)? How great a
disruption would this require? Second, what limits should be imposed on the state's use of
neurobiological interventions as an adjunct to punishment-perhaps to induce remorse? See
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-24 (1990) (discussing the framework for involuntary
medication of prisoners). What if the defendant requests such an intervention?
292. LAFAVE, supra note 262, § 1.5(a)(1).
293. See id. § 1.5(a)(4) ("Mhe sufferings of the criminal for the crime he has committed are
supposed to deter other from committing future crimes, lest they suffer the same unfortunate
fate.")
294. Are there any internal limits on the amount of punishment that may be meted out in
the name of deterrence? Extremely harsh punishments for minor crimes would certainly serve as
effective deterrents. The reason for restraint in this regard is a controversial and much-discussed
topic among scholars and commentators. For a discussion of this question, see, for example,
Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment:
Relative To What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 575-76 (2005), and Snead, supra note
"Proportionality"
259, at 1270 n.18. See also R. A. Duff, Penal Communications:Recent Work in the Philosophy of
Punishment, 20 CRIME & JUST. 1, 87 (1996) (I have argued that the strictly consequentialist
accounts of the aims of punishment (whether or not our pursuit of such aims is to be constrained
by independent requirements of justice) are open to serious and, I think, conclusive moral
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to work, convicted criminals, jurors, and the broader society must all
remember fitly and truly. To understand why this is so, and the
related challenges that memory modification may pose to effective
deterrence, consider again the hypothetical cases outlined above.
When deciding whom and how much to punish, a preliminary
question for such calibration relates to the gravity and magnitude of
the harms to be prevented. That is, the gravest harms-the worst
crimes-demand maximal deterrence, and thus the harshest
penalties. The sentencing jury's discernment on this question is
structured and guided in a variety of ways, including by the
enumeration of aggravating factors (discussed above). But, as in the
context of retributive justice, fully (and fairly) grasping the brutality
of a crime requires well-ordered emotional sensibilities, including
functional capacities for empathy and indignation. In a reasonable
and emotionally healthy juror, the indignation and revulsion in the
face of crime bears an important relation to the societal interest in
preventing it. Thus, the examples of juror memory modification
described in Cases 5 and 6 raise concerns for effective deterrence. In
both instances, the failure to remember fitly threatens to compromise
the appropriate assessment of the crime's gravity and thus the proper
calibration of punishment in the name of deterrence. The jurors in
Case 5, who recall the facts of the crime as emotionally neutral, may
find it difficult to fairly appraise the harshness of the defendant's
actions and thus choose a degree of punishment that does not track
the harm to be avoided. Conversely, in Case 5, a superabundance of
emotion and stress associated with the crime might lead the jurors to
choose a degree of punishment that exceeds that quantity necessary
for effective deterrence.
Regarding the defendant and the broader members of society
who might be inclined to commit similar crimes, memory modification
may likewise complicate the task of distributing punishment in the
name of deterrence. Successful deterrence depends on rational
behavior driven by self-interest: "[e]ven if potential criminals do not
care enough about others to refrain from criminal behavior, they will
refrain if they know that they themselves will suffer from their illegal
actions. ''295 But what if, as in the example of Case 2, through memory
erasure, defendants (or other would-be criminals in society) can force a
radical disruption in personal identity? That is, whether the defendant
objections, however sophisticated an account they offer of those aims: for they still remain open
to some version of the charge that they cannot do justice to or respect the moral standing of the
guilty.").
295. Dresser, supra note 2, at 437.
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(or similar would-be criminal) regards his unmemoried future self as a
different person? As Rebecca Dresser has observed:
Without the further fact of personal identity-without knowing whether a future person
will remain the present person, or become someone else-the present person has no
more reason to prevent harm to that future person than to prevent harm to other
present persons. If potential criminals do not mind exposing others to harm, then they
cannot be justified
will not mind exposing their future selves either. Thus, punishment
296
on grounds that it produces either general or specific deterrence.

The effectiveness of deterrence thus depends on the degree of
psychological connectedness that the would-be offender feels for his
future self. In most instances, unless the would-be criminal is willing
to annihilate his personal identity through memory erasure, there will
likely be such a feeling or sense of connection. Nevertheless, this kind
of disruption, made possible by memory modification, must be taken
into account in shaping punishment in the name of deterrence.
Finally, remembering crime and the punishment thereof fitly
and truly is necessary to deter future criminals for an additional
reason. As Martha Minow has powerfully argued, forgetting crimes
and their consequences (or the failure to remember with adequate
emotional content) risks their repetition in the future. 297 Should
effective and widespread memory erasure or dampening become
routine, this aim of deterrence could be confounded.
3. Remembering Fitly and Truly Is Essential to
Effective Rehabilitation
The distributive principle of punishment known as
"Rehabilitation" (also called "Correction" or "Reformation" ) aims to
help the offender heal himself so that he will no longer wish to commit
such crimes in the future. 298 This intervention is undertaken both for
the sake of itself (to help a fellow member of the polity) and for the
299
consequentialist motive of preventing social harms in the future.

296. Id. (discussing Parfit's reductive theory of personal identity).
297. See Minow, supra note 246, at 430 ('CThe question is whether we can learn to remember
atrocities so that we resolve always to prevent them .... ").
298. LAFAVE, supra note 262, § 1.5(a)(3) ("[W]e 'punish' the convicted criminal by giving him
appropriate treatment, in order to rehabilitate him and return him to society so reformed that he
will not desire or need to commit further crimes."). LaFave notes that rehabilitation is perhaps
not rightly understood as punishment in the same way as the other traditional distributive
theories, "as the emphasis is away from making him suffer and in the direction of making his life
better and more pleasant." Id.
299. See id. (highlighting both the rehabilitative and crime prevention functions of this
approach); Dresser, supra note 2, at 443-44 ('The intent is to reduce the crime rate, enhance the
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The defendant's memory is crucial to this project. More
specifically, remembering his crime fitly and truly plays an important
role in healing and becoming a better citizen and person. For example,
appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct-the gravity of his harm
and the human costs to the victim and community-are necessary for
understanding why he should change his life. This requires true
memory, suffused with fitting shame and indignation. The defendant
in Case 2-whose memory is erased by Rohypnol or ECT-may not
have a true, accurate memory of his crime. The defendant in Case 3whose memory is dampened by propranolol-may not have a visceral
appreciation of the human costs of his actions sufficient to motivate a
life change. In both Cases 2 and 3, owing to defects of memory, the
defendant may not be able to locate the story of his crime within a
redemptive narrative in his own life. He would not, in the words of the
President's Council on Bioethics, "give new meaning to old
happenings." The defendant in Case 4, who is tortured by recurring
memories of his crime attended by a superabundance of stress and
pain, may not be capable of forgiving himself for his past bad acts and
moving forward-an important aspect of rehabilitation. Moreover, the
society that receives the offender back into its fold after his
incarceration and treatment must likewise remember the crime fitly
and truly. Its members must remember enough to hold the offender to
account, but not too much (i.e., with too much emotion), so as to not
accept that he has paid for his crime and must be re-integrated.
Memory modification (especially of the sort discussed in Case 6) might
3 00
frustrate this process of successful re-entry.
4. Remembering Fitly and Truly Is Essential to
Effective Incapacitation
"Incapacitation" (also called "restraint," "isolation," or
"disablement") has as its aim the direct protection of society from
dangerous criminals. 30 1 Shaping punishment to meet this goal
requires the relevant state actors to identify "those offenders most
likely to persist in committing crimes, and to sentence such persons to

former criminal's opportunities for satisfaction, and thus produce important benefits for
society.").
300. An interesting question, beyond the scope the present inquiry but worth noting for
future consideration, is whether it should be permissible for the state to use memory
modification-erasure, dampening, or enhancement-as a tool of rehabilitation.
301. LAFAVE, supra note 262, § 1.5(a)(2) ("[Slociety may protect itself from persons deemed
dangerous because of their past criminal conduct by isolating these persons from society.').
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longer prison terms than others convicted of the same offense." 30 2 The
principal task of punishment under this theory is thus predictionparticularly regarding future dangerousness. Incapacitation is only
effective insofar as it follows accurate prediction about future
behavior. Under this theory, the distributive questions of whom to
punish and how much punishment is due are thus driven by
prediction.
sine qua non of effective
Successful prediction-the
incapacitation-depends on insights that touch and concern personal
identity. Predicting how an individual will act in the future requires
certainty that his relevant traits and behaviors will persist over time.
Thus, prediction is grounded in key assumptions about the continuity
of personal identity. Continuity in personal identity depends on
memory, for reasons discussed at length above. 30 3 Thus, when extreme
forms of memory modification can disrupt personal identity, accurate
prediction may become very difficult. If the memory modification
works a substantial change in the defendant's impulses and
disposition, he may very well refrain from repeating prior bad acts. Or
he may not. In any event, the stakes are high, as Rebecca Dresser has
noted: "[s]harp discontinuity [in personality] ... could30 4also result in
needlessly confining a presently nondangerous person."
Take, for example, the defendant in Case 2. Might the erasure
of certain memories likewise erase cues and associations that prompt
violent responses? Analogous strategies are being explored to treat
addiction. 305 How should the jurors at sentencing approach the
question of prediction in this case? Memory modification, by
confounding personal identity, likewise complicates this process.
5. Remembering Fitly and Truly Is Essential to the
Moral Educative and Restorative Purposes of Punishment
Finally, memory (and, by extension, memory modification) has
important implications for relatively newer distributive principles of
punishment, namely the moral educative and restorative theories of
punishment. Under the moral educative theory, punishment is shaped
with the pedagogical purpose of communicating to the polity "the
proper distinctions between good conduct and bad-distinctions

302.
303.
304.
305.

Dresser, supra note 2, at 442.
See supraPart 111.1.
Dresser, supra note 2, at 443.
Mass. Gen. Hosp., supranote 132.
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' 30 6

R. A. Duff has

applied this notion to the defendant herself, and argues that this form
of punishment communicates society's "condemnation or censure" and
involves "a penitential process that aims to bring the offender to
repent her crime and, through her repentance, to repair those
relationships that it damaged." 307 In this way, both as applied to the
defendant and the broader community, punishment aims to shape
30 8
behavior by moral formation.
Closely related to this theory of punishment is "restorative
justice" (or simply, "restoration"), which focuses on "making amends
for the offending, particularly the harm caused to the victim, rather
than inflicting pain on the offender." 30 9 Restorative justice is driven by
the notion that crime works a serious disruption in the social
relationships between offender and the victim and community that
must be repaired. 310 Procedurally, it involves reuniting the victim and
offender so that the former may express his personal suffering from
the crime and the latter may acknowledge his wrongdoing and offer
his remorse in return (and in some cases make restitution).311 In this
way, restorative justice aims to mend the rift between them. To be
successful, this project requires appropriate degrees of shame and
remorse (on the part of the offender) along with controlled indignation,
empathy, and something like forgiveness (on the part of the victim).
Another iteration of restorative justice involves reintegration of
both offenders and victims into a society, often after a large-scale
atrocity. This process involves restoring such individuals to what
Martha Minow has referred to as "the community of humanity. 31 2
Restoration in this sense requires uncovering injustices and holding
wrongdoers to account. It involves the work of moral witnesses-those
who observed and suffered atrocity first hand-to testify to the
injustices done and to preserve the memory of victims. It
simultaneously involves a kind of remembrance and reconciliation, in
order to avoid fanning the flames of vengeance.

306. LAFAVE, supra note 262, § 1.5(a)(5).
307. Duff, supra note 294, at 87-88.
308. See Alschuler, supra note 266, at 1 n. 1 (noting that this theory of punishment "seeks to
influence conduct through mechanisms other than the fear of punishment').
309. LAFAVE, supra note 262, §1.5(a)(7) (Supp. 2010/2011) (quoting Erik Luna, Introduction:

The Utah Restorative Justice Conference, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1, 3).
310. See id.
311. See id.
312. See Minow, supranote 246, at 430.
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Remembering fitly and truly is integral to all of these theories
of punishment. The moral educative function requires the members of
the community to remember the fact of the crime, and to regard it
with a fitting emotional response. Without such memory, the
punishment will seem either too harsh or too lenient and will not
resonate with the moral sensibilities of the polity. Dampening,
erasing, or enhancing the memory of the crime will confound the
pedagogical aims of the punishment in this context.
On the micro level (between offender and victim), restoration
requires a true and fitting memory of the crime. To express the human
costs fully, the victim must remember the details of the crime as they
occurred and must convey the fitting emotional response. Memory
erasure, dampening, or enhancement might interfere with such a
rendering. To take on board the enormity of one's crimes and feel
authentic shame and remorse requires an intact memory (factually
and affectively) of the crime. It likewise requires empathy-seeing
oneself in the place of the victim by recalling instances in which one
suffered injustice. This requires a similarly intact memory of one's
past. Memory modification-erasure, dampening, and enhancementis an obstacle to success in this regard.
On the macro level, the process of reintegrating victims and
perpetrators of mass atrocity into the community requires a kind of
true and fitting remembrance. As Martha Minow has observed, in
such cases the aim is to hold wrongdoers to account without creating a
new cycle of hatred and violence:
The task is to help the society-and the watching world-not merely recall but also remember, that is, to reconstitute a community of humanity against which there can be
crimes (hence, "crimes against humanity"), and within which victims and survivors can
be reclaimed as worthy members. Indeed, the task is to help avoid the castigation and
exclusion of whole groups of people-labeled as co-nationalists or otherwise associated
with perpetrators-from the sphere of common concern... For it is that fundamental
humanity that entitles [those charged and eventually convicted of war crimes] to both
procedural rights and to inclusion within the legally-framed sphere of human
3 13
responsibility. Otherwise, they could simply be targets for retaliation and revenge.

Remembrance of such atrocities must be true and fitting-to do justice
to victims (and survivors) and avoid their repetition. Accordingly,
"[flailure to remember, collectively, injustice and cruelty is an ethical
breach. '314 But the affective content of such memories should not
render it impossible to be fair and just to the perpetrators, nor should
it lead to the scapegoating of those connected to the perpetrators who

313. Id. at 430-31.
314. MINOW, supra note 222, at 28.
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bear no responsibility for the atrocities. Remembering truly and fitly
in this case is a delicate balance. Memory modification may raise
challenges for such a balance. Forgetting through erasure, dampening
memory such that atrocities are remembered as emotionally neutral,
or enhancing memory to keep the pain of injustice as a constant open
wound crying out for vengeance, are all anathema to the kind of "remembering" that "re-affirm[s] the central insight of human rights:
that all people share sufficient fundamental worth to be guaranteed
membership within the group called humanity." 315
CONCLUSION

This Article has examined the deep connections between
memory and the foundational distributive principles of punishment. It
has argued that new neurobiological techniques for the modification of
memory pose, in principle, serious challenges for the just and effective
distribution of punishment under all of the dominant theoretical
approaches. How (if at all) should the law respond to this insight? This
is a question for future scholarship involving vexing normative
questions relating to a panoply of issues, including (but certainly not
limited to) privacy, autonomy, and justice as well as more concrete
questions relating to the criminal process, the regulation for drug
manufacture and advertising, and the governance of the practice of
medicine. The Article has essayed to lay the necessary groundwork for
such a broad, interdisciplinary dialogue to go forward.

315. Minow, supra note 246, at 431.

